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51. Introduction
My reasons for choosing this particular topic for my thesis are manifold. First, 
having done translation work for a number of years now, I have always been 
very interested in the mechanisms of translating and in the ongoing 
processes of the mind when words from one language are being transferred 
to another. Another reason for me was, how important a part do feeling and 
intuition play in the translation process? Furthermore, the possibility of 
translating metaphor has been a central topic of discussion for some years 
now.
My parents brought me up to be bilingual from early childhood on, so much of 
my access to both German and English takes place on an emotional level. As 
a child, in particular, I believed that I just could not translate from one 
language into the other because a word or expression “felt” differently. It was 
as if I had two hard disks, one for each language, without any connection in 
between. Later, I realised that translation was actually possible, but still, for 
me it can only ever be a compromise––sometimes, two words, even if they 
mean exactly the same, don’t sound “right” in the other language. In the 
course of a translation workshop,  one of my teachers at university once put 
the matter in a nutshell, as the saying goes, and said, “You can never 
translate words as such; all you can ever hope to translate are situations!” 
Hence the title of my thesis. Translation is a delicate undertaking, like walking 
through a minefield of potential misunderstanding and misinterpretation––and 
this is especially the case with idiom and metaphor. 
In this paper, I aim to deal with issues such as, what makes a good 
translator? What are the main features of a successful translation? Is there 
any such thing as real equivalence? Often a word might mean the same in 
another language on the surface but “feels” differently, as I stated above. 
Mainly, however, I plan to establish what translation of metaphor really 
entails. Theories on the subject are few and far between. I shall examine 
some of the few existing ones in detail, especially those with cognitive 
aspects. Therefore, my focus will be on the cognitive theory of metaphor as 
6proposed by Lakoff and Johnson ([1980] 2003). I shall also mention other 
perspectives, including the philosophical background of metaphor, to 
complete the overall picture, though without going into greater detail.
Must an expression evoke the same emotions in both languages? If so, I do 
not believe that metaphor can be translated at all. Is it enough to retain its 
“power” or “effect” or “meaning”? What is a translator to do if a metaphor 
proves too stubborn––translate it verbatim, use another metaphor, convert it 
to simile, add extra information that keeps some of its emotive or cultural 
effects, reduce it to literal language (always assuming that this can be 
actually done), or simply delete it?
Are metaphors culture-specific, or can they be transferred from one culture to 
another? Some authors claim that some metaphors are universal, as 
experience entails so much more than just a specific cultural background. 
This would mean that metaphor can be translated across any two languages 
without loss of effect or meaning. Others, however, maintain that some 
metaphors at least are untranslatable, especially those used for effect, such 
as in advertising1. I am especially interested in so-called original (or novel) 
metaphors, i.e. metaphors coined by an author to relate a new aspect of the 
world to his readers, as well as in poetic metaphors. Some metaphors can be 
transferred across two languages and, by the same token, across two 
cultures; others are utterly untranslatable––and this fact can thoroughly 
confuse the translator. The main focus of this paper, however, is the question 
whether metaphor can be translated at all––that is, transferred from one 
language (and culture) to another without incurring any losses whatsoever––
and my gut feeling (and personal experience) tells me that it cannot. Loss is 
inevitable if one tries to leap across the conceptual gulf that exists between 
any two cultures––even if they share a common language, as do Austria and 
Germany, or England and America––and in the case of two different 
languages all there can ever exist is a compromise. 
1 Think of the chocolate slogan from the eighties: “Have a break––have a KitKat!” This has 
never been translated as the original wordplay would have been lost entirely. Today 
advertisers seem to be less ingenious: The infamous McDonald’s slogan “I’m lovin’ it” has 
been inexpertly translated as “Ich liebe es”––which has an altogether different implication…
7I have chosen Salman Rushdie’s “Satanic Verses” because I am a great 
admirer of Rushdie’s work, and India has always held a special fascination 
for me (my affinity for things Indian was probably passed down to me by my 
English grandfather, who was a major in Her Majesty’s army and served in 
India and Pakistan). I feel Rushdie’s language is almost magical, so full of 
parable, allegory, and poetic metaphor. Of course, his Islamic and Persian 
background has greatly influenced his poetic language, and I am not an 
expert on these issues, but I shall endeavour to analyse a number of 
metaphors that are clearly delineated and recognisable as such (and Allah 
knows there are enough of those!). I was, of course, sorely tempted to tap 
into the lushness of Rushdie’s rich prose and to go off on a tangent 
eulogising about Rushdie’s style, and almost ended up doing a literary 
analysis rather than a linguistic one; even if––an idea I obstinately cling to––
the two cannot be strictly separated as any literary evaluation hinges upon 
the linguistic angle. 
In my analysis, I plan to focus on religious metaphor (e.g. blasphemy, God 
and Satan, the archangel Gabriel, prophets, Mohammad and the Q’uran) in 
my analysis, but other metaphorical concepts such as life and death, flying 
and falling, migration and translation, cities, etc. will also be dealt with in this 
paper, always with a view to their translation. 
Finally, I shall investigate how the translator of the “Satanic Verses” has 
solved the problem of metaphor translation in general, as well as specific 
cases, again focussing on the types of metaphor mentioned above. 
Thus, I hope to be able to evaluate the quality and appropriateness of some 
of the translator’s solutions. She may have felt a bit like Fat Cat below, utterly 
baffled at some (idiomatic) expressions and equally nonplussed at others… 
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92. Section I – The Theoretical Part
2.1. A (very) short outline of the history of metaphor
The words of a living language are like creatures: they are alive. Each word has 
a physical character, a look and a personality, an ancestry, an expectation of 
life and death, a hope of posterity. Some words strike us as beautiful, some 
ugly, some evil. The word glory seems to shine; the common word for 
excrement seems to smell. There are holy words, like the proper name of God, 
pronounced only once a year in the innermost court of Jerusalem’s Temple. 
There are magic words, spells to open gates and safes, summon spirits, put an 
end to the world. What are magic spells but magic spellings? Words sing to us, 
frighten us, impel us to self-immolation and murder. They belong to us; they 
couple at our order, to make what have well been called the aureate words of 
poets and the inkhorn words of pedants. We can keep our words alive, or at our 
caprice we can kill them—though some escape and prosper in our despite.
Morris Bishop, Good Usage, Bad Usage, and Usage2
Philosophers, linguists or psychologists of many bents have speculated
about the exact nature of metaphor, and theories on the matter abound. 
Metaphor3 has become an interdisciplinary topic and a central issue not only 
for rhetoricians and literary critics but for advanced thinkers in psychology, art 
history, philosophy, and theology. To remain within the boundaries of 
linguistics (and psychology, which is closely related with regard to this topic), 
and to make use of Gibbs’ list (in Cameron 1999: 29), but without going into 
detail, we have the salience-imbalance theory by Ortony (1979c), the 
domains-interaction theory by Tourangeau and Sternberg (1981, 1982), the 
structure-mapping theory proposed by Gentner and Clements (1988), and 
the class-inclusion theory as put forward by Glucksberg and Keysar (1990). 
Outside of psychology, other theories need to be mentioned, such as the 
speech act theory by Searle (1979), the no-meaning theory of Davidson
(1979), the semantic-field theory by Kittay (1987), similarity-creating theory 
proposed by Indurkhaya (1992), and the relevance theory put forward by 
Sperber and Wilson (1985/86). To describe all of these hypotheses and 
theories in detail would by far exceed the boundaries of this paper. For this 
reason I plan to focus on the cognitive theory of metaphor as put forward by 
2 In Rheingold 2000, introduction. 
3 “meta phor” (ancient Greek) means “borne across”, similar to the Latin word “translatio”
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Lakoff and Johnson (2003) resp. Lakoff and Turner (1989), and its closest 
“relatives”. 
2.1.1. The cognitive approach
[Does] the mind discover likeness in the unlike in order to clarify the world, or to obscure the 
impossibility of such clarification?4
People tend to think that poetic language is completely different from the 
ordinary, everyday variety, and regard metaphor as part of the former, 
something alien, flighty or ephemeral that normal people do not use. 
However, metaphor is entirely different to common belief: It is in fact so 
ordinary that we use it unconsciously and automatically, even as children. 
Brisard and Sandra (2000) even go so far as to say that “metaphors are 
events, not objects”.5 Language makes use of general cognitive 
mechanisms, at least of categorisation mechanisms, and despite a positivist 
tradition which dismisses metaphor as irrelevant, recent work by many 
theorists provides evidence of its ubiquity (cf. Lakoff 1987). A symposium 
“Metaphor: The Conceptual Leap” at the University of Chicago in February 
1978 (cf. Sacks’ preface to “On Metaphor” 1981) mainly triggered the 
discussions that are based on Cassirer’s notion that metaphor leads us back 
“to the fundamental form of verbal conceiving” (ibid.). Gardner and Winner (in 
Sacks 1981: 123) have investigated the development of metaphoric 
competence, as their article is called, and claim that there are four areas of 
interest central to psychology and philosophy. First, they focus on the
specificity of the processes involved in metaphor, and on whether metaphoric 
skill is actually part of our linguistic skill, or a wider human capacity, linked to 
general perceptual and conceptual processes. Second, staying within the 
area of language, the question arises whether metaphor is a special kind of 
trope with its own rules, properties and applications, or allied with other 
tropes such as similes, analogies and hyperbole. Then they ask whether all 
4 Rushdie, Salman, Shalimar The Clown, Random House N.Y. 2006, p. 226
5 Brisard, Frank, Dominiek Sandra, Braiding the multiple threads of interdisciplinary research 
on metaphor. Workshop at the Japanese Cognitive Science Society's Annual Meeting 
(2000), Shizuoka Art and Culture University, Hamamatsu, Japan, June 30 - July 2 2000. 
(Thread 3: Psychology)
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metaphors can be investigated in the same way or differently, according to 
the respective type of metaphor (e.g. cross-sensory, perceptual, 
psychological-physical or predicative), and, finally, whether metaphoric usage 
could be better explained by analysing the structure of language (e.g. 
semantic features of topic and vehicle) or by considering its pragmatic 
effects, as in actual speech acts. (Gardner and Winner, in Sacks 1981: 123)
These common concerns have been addressed by numerous authors I have 
come across in my research, and some answers will be provided below. 
Gardner and Winner (in Sacks 1981: 128) have made some interesting 
points, such as their twofold definition of metaphoric competence: this 
consists first and foremost in metaphoric comprehension, which is the ability 
to paraphrase a figure of speech, but also in metaphoric production, which, 
according to them, is a late-developing ability that requires considerable 
linguistic and metalinguistic competence. This contradicts Lakoff and 
Johnson’s (2003: 6) view, who assert that metaphor is a tool of thought which 
we develop at a very early age, albeit mostly unconsciously. However, 
children can also use metaphor quite deliberately. For example, when asked 
to describe the clouds in the sky, my three-year-old daughter, after pondering 
for a while, called them “lots of broccoli swimming across the sky”. When I 
asked her if she really thought the clouds were made of broccoli, and if this 
vegetable could really swim, she replied that of course this was not the case: 
The clouds were white not green, but just as “squishy-squashy looking” as 
broccoli. This ties in with a 1977 study (H R Pollio et al, quoted in Aitchison 
1994: 154), according to which this spontaneous use of metaphor occurs 
often with young children but decreases with age, and the fastest among 
children who attend a high-standard school.
Returning to the subject of metaphoric competence, Gardner and Winner (in 
Sacks 1981: 136) have discerned two (dissociable) aspects of it: on the one 
hand, it refers to the capacity of providing linguistic paraphrases of a frozen 
figure of speech6, which takes place in the left hemisphere of the human 
brain, and on the other hand to the sensitivity to the pragmatics (context) of 
metaphoric utterances (a matter of the right hemisphere). The two combine 
6 a thought which is not shared by many authors, see also below
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to a sense of the occasion on which a given figure of speech is likely to be 
uttered, which also has some neuropsychological implications.
Metaphors are essential tools of thought, not simply literary devices, and an 
analysis of them yields a better understanding of social assumptions (cf. 
Spivey 1997: 2). In academia, for instance, scholars in the same field tend to 
share the same theoretical metaphors to provide frames for understanding 
complex processes, but also in a generative capacity. Spivey goes on to 
discuss the metaphors of construction as the creative production of the mind, 
such as taking someone else’s point of view, and refers to Piaget’s well-
known constructivist claim that knowledge structures influence how we 
construe our reality (cf. Spivey 1997: 15).
 Metaphor is omnipresent, it permeates our thoughts, and it is conventional, 
an integral part of our every-day thought and language. Moreover, it allows 
us to understand ourselves and our world in a way no other tool of thought 
would allow us to. Therefore, one can safely claim that metaphor is not 
merely a matter of words, as is widely believed, but rather a matter of 
thought, and it is indispensable to our imagination and reasoning. Aitchison 
(1994: 148), in her much-acclaimed book “Words in the Mind”, describes 
metaphor as “simply the use of a word with one or more of the ‘typicality 
conditions’ attached to it broken” and states that the use of such words is so 
common that we hardly notice them any longer. Furthermore, while it is 
relatively easy to mix metaphors, according to her it is rather difficult, if not 
downright impossible, to find inapplicable ones, that is, metaphors nobody 
would be able to understand, at least  in some way, as most people are 
equipped with a lively imagination and therefore rather good at finding 
possible explanations. Poets who know their trade can speak to us because 
we all share the same basic modes of thought (cf. Lakoff and Turner 1989, 
preface to “More Than Cool Reason”), and by drawing our attention to new 
images in their work, they are able to open new vistas of thought. 
Basically, we can say that as soon as we understand one thing in terms of 
another we use metaphor. More scientifically speaking, metaphor is defined 
as a set of correspondences between two conceptual domains, where one 
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domain is mapped7 on, i.e. understood partly in terms of, the other. Take, for 
instance, a very basic metaphor, one that can be found in most of the 
literature on metaphor, i.e. DEATH IS DEPARTURE––this is reflected by 
English idioms such as “he has left us”, “she has passed away”, or “the 
departed”. Partly means that the metaphor highlights some aspects of 
departure (e.g. saying farewell, being gone) but disregards others (e.g. 
packing a suitcase, locking the door). By thinking of death as someone 
leaving us, we understand that they are gone, no longer with us, and thus try 
to grasp something as complex and unthinkable as death in terms of 
something we understand well enough––departure. In a way, this metaphor 
helps us to come to terms with issues we would otherwise find unacceptable,
such as death. 
Such conceptual metaphors often underlie poetic language; poets may have 
extended and composed them in novel ways, but most of the time they do
not invent these metaphors as such. This runs counter to the aforementioned 
belief that metaphor is a matter of language only. Rather, we need to 
distinguish between basic conceptual metaphors, which are cognitive in 
nature and may be very common, and the linguistic expressions of these 
concepts, which may then be novel or unique: We need to differentiate 
between metaphorical thought as such and the language that expresses it. 
As Lakoff and Turner (1989: 50) phrase it, “Any discussion of the uniqueness 
or idiosyncrasy of a metaphor must therefore take place on two levels: the 
conceptual level and the linguistic level. […] In short, idiosyncrasy of 
language may or may not express idiosyncrasy of thought, but idiosyncratic 
thought requires idiosyncratic language”.  This also means that “the relatively 
small number of basic conceptual metaphors can be combined conceptually 
and expressed in an infinite variety of linguistic expressions” (Lakoff and 
Turner 1989: 51). By contrast, the so-called original (or novel) metaphors, i.e. 
7  In their afterword of the edition 2003, Lakoff and Johnson have somewhat amended this 
initial view of mathematical mapping as they had described it in their edition of 1980; rather, 
metaphor can also add elements, entities and relations to the respective target domain 
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 253). They also relate that Narayanan (1997) has developed a 
new topographic theory in which conceptual metaphors are mapped neurally, i.e. neural 
circuits linking the sensory-motor system to the cortex (Lakoff and Johnson  2003: 255). This 
neural learning mechanism creates a stable system of basic conventional metaphors that 
remain in the mind indefinitely, independent of the respective language (2003: 256). 
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metaphors coined by an author to relate a new aspect of the world to his 
readers, with no given relationship between topic and vehicle, are 
idiosyncratic in their conception, and can only be expressed linguistically by 
using special poetic metaphors8. 
However, we need to keep in mind that metaphor is not just for poets but part 
of our everyday life, and it is the principal way we understand abstract 
concepts such as life, death, love or time. The more metaphors there are for 
a concept, the more central it is to our lives, and when we try to comprehend 
the wealth of our experiences in these domains, no single, consistent 
structuring of that experience would do (cf. Lakoff and Turner 1989: 52). 
Instead, we use structures from a wide range of very different, often 
contradictory, domains to understand different aspects of the concept. 
Poetry just makes use of basic concepts by endowing them with particular 
linguistic expressions, or by extending ordinary conventionalised metaphors. 
So, to return to our initial metaphor of DEATH IS DEPARTURE, we could talk 
about someone “packing their last suitcase”9. As this unusual wording 
attracts attention to itself it becomes conscious, thus drawing upon cognitive 
resources different from those used automatically in the case of 
conventionalised metaphors. Else, a poet could use our familiarity with 
certain basic conceptual metaphors to modify them in an unusual way, which 
requires effort on the reader’s part when analysing it. This is due to the fact 
that, normally, only certain aspects of the metaphor are “used” for mapping 
while another remains “unused” Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 53) describe 
imaginative metaphor as either extensions of such used parts of a metaphor, 
as instances of its unused parts, or as completely new, i.e. novel metaphors.
Another poetic device for using metaphor would be compression: an author 
can combine two or even more metaphors in a single sentence, which is not 
usual in everyday language, and thus draw attention to them (other tools to 
8 See e.g. Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (English version) page 34 “How had the past 
BUBBLED up […]”, implying the resemblance of one’s past experience to oxygen bubbling 
up through the waters of the mind, or as in a fizzy drink such as champagne.
9 However, in the course of my work I have come across this expression, albeit in non-
standard German––my sister, who is a vet, uttered it (“Der packt grad seine Koffer!”) in 
connection with a male pig on its last legs… This would also be a typical example of the 
difficulty arising from having to translate some metaphors.
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render poetry unusual would be phonological or syntactical complexity and 
the like, which is entirely independent of metaphorical use). However, Bryson
(2000: 127) has pointed out, in his inimitable way, the perils of ineptly 
combined, so-called mixed metaphor10, by quoting Fowler’s famous 
examples, “This is a virgin field pregnant with possibilities” and, “He has been 
made a sacrificial lamb for taking the lid off a can of worms” (Fowler 1999:
491, in Bryson 2000: 127). Rushdie himself quotes Orwell, who has provided 
“beautiful parodies of politicians’ metaphor-mixing: `The Fascist octopus has 
sung its swan song, the jackboot is thrown into the melting pot’”, and 
continues with a report in The Times about the smuggling of classified 
documents out of Civil Service departments, referring to the “increased 
frequency of ‘leaks’ from ‘a high-level mole’” (Rushdie 1991: 98). Such 
combinations are of course profoundly undesirable (even if rather funny), 
their shortcomings lying not so much in the mixture of metaphors but in that 
of hackneyed clichés. Not every poet is in Shakespeare’s league, who wrote, 
“Or to take arms against a sea of troubles, and by opposing end them”, one 
of Hamlet’s utterances, which represents a masterful combination of two 
fresh metaphors. However, Bryson (2000: 127) also points out that “it isn’t 
necessary to have two metaphors to botch a sentence. One will do if it is 
sufficiently inappropriate” and goes on to quote a newspaper cutting which 
claimed that “Indiana, ranked the No. 1 swimming power in the nation, 
walked away with the Big Ten championships tonight”.
To summarise, we can say that, usually, poets do not create the metaphors 
their work is based upon (except maybe in avant-garde poetry). Instead, “it is 
the masterful way in which poets extend, compose, and compress them that 
we find poetic” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 54). 
The question now is, how does the metaphorical process actually function? 
Basically, understanding metaphor requires knowledge, especially in the 
case of conventional or conventionalised metaphor. In order to comprehend 
a target domain in terms of a source domain, the latter must be familiar to us. 
We understand the target domain partly in terms of the source domain, which 
10 which Fowler himself defined as “the application of two or more inconsistent metaphors to 
a given situation” (in Burchfield 1999: 491)
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means that we realise how some aspects of the latter apply to another 
concept while others do not. Lakoff and Turner (1989: 61) have called this 
basic knowledge a “schema” (i.e. knowledge structured in a skeletal form11) 
and use the term “slots” for elements of a schema that are to be filled in (i.e. 
adapted to the situation at hand). This metaphoric structuring helps us to 
grasp abstract ideas such as life and death. As soon as we have learned 
such a schema we know it for good, it becomes conventionalised and we use 
it automatically, unconsciously, and without effort. At this point, Lakoff and 
Turner (1989) draw our attention to the fact that conceptual schemas and 
metaphors have a certain power over us as we rely on them to understand 
the world around us. Conventionalised schemas and metaphors have a 
persuasive power, arising from the internal structure of metaphor.
2.1.2. What is metaphor?
I gotta use words when I talk
T S Eliot
The answer to the question of what metaphor is seems to have been 
provided already––or has it? The best way of doing so would be “to begin 
with what is not metaphorical. In brief, to the extent that a concept is 
understood and structured on its own terms––without making use of a 
structure imported from a completely different conceptual domain––we will 
say that it is not metaphorical” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 57). As metaphoricity 
has to do with certain aspects of a concept, we therefore cannot regard an 
entire concept as either metaphorical or non-metaphorical. This means that 
part of a concept can be understood literally, i.e. without metaphor, while 
another aspect of it requires metaphorical interpretation. This is due to the 
fact that we believe some of our concepts are not based upon metaphor but 
grounded in our physical and social experience, such as journeys, fire, day 
and night, heat and cold, locations and others. These concepts serve as 
source domains for many a metaphor, and in this sense, at least, we 
understand them non-metaphorically. 
11 Widdowson calls a schema the “normal pattern of reality” which people establish in their 
minds by linking certain linguistic features with features of their world when making an 
indexical connection (1996: 63). 
17
Of course, cultural anthropology tells us that even our physical and social 
experiences are understood in different ways from one culture to another, but 
still, their grounding is not metaphoric––we actually live these concepts, 
regardless of our culture, as some metaphors are grounded in our biological 
makeup. 
Nogales (1999: 11) points out that, in order to recognise an utterance12 as 
being metaphorical, there must be some difference between the metaphor 
vehicle and the metaphor subject. For instance, saying that “a full-stop is a 
semi-colon” is not understood in a metaphorical sense as the similarity 
between these two punctuation marks is too great. The same applies to 
Aitchison’s examples such as “wine is whisky” or “cars are lorries” or 
“marmalade is jam” (1994: 150). She states that the items involved must not 
share the major characteristics, and that it is best if they come from a 
different semantic field altogether. However, they must share some features, 
even if we can usually think up some characteristics they might have in 
common, given time enough to ponder on it. This is especially the case in 
what the author calls “prototypical metaphors”, i.e. metaphors where the 
items involved are usually dissimilar in that they come from different semantic 
fields, but also similar in that they share obvious but minor characteristics. 
What, however, are we supposed to do with expressions such as “emerald 
ghost” or “doom’s electric moccasin”, taken from a poem of Emily Dickinson’s 
(Aitchison 1994: 151)? This rather arouses multiple associations, and this is 
what Lakoff (Lakoff and Johnson 2003) has called the “activation of frames”, 
the multiple mapping that takes place when we comprehend one thing in 
terms of another.
So far, we have established that metaphors are based on concepts and the 
way these concepts interact. When we communicate with other human 
beings, we interact as physical entities with other such physical entities, and 
therefore we use a language that serves our needs. Since these needs are 
often corporeal, the terms we use for referring to physically delineated 
12 Nogales defines an “utterance” as a “sentence in context”, never isolated, saying that 
metaphor cannot occur at sentence level (1999: 13)
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objects must also be clearly delineated. This is what we understand as a 
basic concept, and it underlies all metaphoricity. 
2.1.3. Types of metaphor
The essence of metaphor is understanding and
 experiencing one thing in terms of another13
Having established the fact that human thought processes are mostly 
metaphorical, Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 5) go on to describe the 
systematicity of metaphorical concepts, claiming that, since metaphorical 
expressions in a language are tied to metaphorical concepts systematically, 
we are able to use the respective expressions to study the nature of these 
metaphorical concepts, and the way metaphorical expressions highlight one 
aspect of a concept while hiding others. They also arrive at the conclusion 
that many of our metaphorical concepts, such as TIME IS MONEY, are 
specific to our industrialised culture. Moreover, if we say that a concept is
structured metaphorically, we mean that it is partially structured by metaphor, 
and that it can be extended in some ways but not in others––which can turn 
out as a pitfall for the unwary translator. 
Lakoff and Johnson (ibid.) list a variety of metaphors, starting with the above-
mentioned structural metaphor, where one concept is metaphorically 
structured in terms of another. Metaphorical concepts that do not structure 
another concept as such but rather a whole system of concepts are called 
orientational metaphors, as they usually have something to do with spatial 
orientation (e.g. up-down, in-out, on-off etc.). Such metaphors are based on 
our physical experience of ourselves and our surroundings, as already 
specified above, and they refer to fundamental concepts, although even here 
cultural differences can arise. As verticality, for instance, is part of our 
everyday experience, it has entered our language in many different literal and 
metaphorical expressions, a fact that highlights the inseparability of 
metaphors from their experiential basis. Moreover, there is systematicity 
13 Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 5
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inherent in spatialisation metaphors, they are not randomly assigned but 
rooted in our cultural as well as physical experience. The ultimate target 
seems to be coherence of the entire system, which is why often one aspect 
of a concept is chosen for the metaphor but not another. Again, this may vary 
from one culture to another, thus making it rather difficult to differentiate 
between the physical and the cultural bases of a metaphor. Furthermore, the 
authors emphasise that, while two metaphors might not be consistent 
(meaning that they do not form a single image but two different ones, as e.g. 
time can be seen either as something moving towards us or as stationary 
while we move through it), they can still fit together in a way, by virtue of 
being subcategories of a minor category and therefore sharing a major 
common entailment (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 44). This suggests that 
metaphors are connected by coherence rather that consistency. 
When defining ontological metaphors (i.e. ways of viewing events, activities, 
emotions ideas, etc., as entities and substances) according to their 
respective purposes, Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 25) also describe container 
metaphors14, which are based on our physical experience of ourselves as 
entities with an inside and an outside, defined by a bounding surface, and 
conduit metaphors, which imply movement of sorts. The container and 
conduit metaphors have so far been combined logically by most authors. In 
his review of “By Word of Mouth” (Goossens et al., 1995), Forceville (1997) 
quotes Reddy’s (1979) claim that “human communication is overwhelmingly 
understood in terms of a speaker or writer transmitting meanings, packaged 
into words, to a listener or reader who, in turn, 'unpacks' the words to obtain 
the meanings” but also points out that the “many different types of 
manipulation that linguistic expressions can undergo (cf. ‘cook up/ adorn/ 
condense/ disclose a story’) moreover reveal that focusing exclusively on the 
containment schema underlying the conduit metaphor constitutes a crude 
oversimplification” (Reddy 1979, in Forceville 1997). Rather, he stresses that 
other metaphorical clusters shape our communication, and that even where 
the conduit metaphor is pertinent, it is always used together with another 
14 Aitchison (1994: 152) points out that such metaphors may go back to the Greek physician 
Hippocrates in the fourth century BC, who assumed that the human body contained four 
humours in the liquid form.
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schema (such as FORCE, PATH, CENTRE-PERIPHERY, BALANCE or 
CONTROL, and CONTACT schemata, by Pauwels and Simon-
Vandenbergen15, who have investigated the source domain of body parts 
that metaphorically shapes communication) to be able to describe specific 
instances adequately. Personification provides another such category of 
ontological metaphors, for which objects are viewed as persons, or rather as 
different aspects of a person. This enables us to grasp many an abstract 
concept in terms of human motivation, characteristics, and activities (p 33). 
Brisar and Sandra (2000)16 distinguish between yet another two sets of 
metaphor types: familiar vs. unfamiliar metaphors, and predicative vs. 
referential metaphors. Metaphor, in their research, is not seen as a semantic 
object with a real correlate in the mental lexicon, but rather as a type of event 
that may trigger different processing strategies, depending on the 
architecture of the brain. According to them there is thus very little room for 
interdisciplinarity in the field of metaphor research in psychology, as the 
question of metaphor within the structure of the language processor does not 
necessarily relate to its status in semantic or pragmatic theories of meaning 
(ibid.). When discussing the topic of comprehension of novel (or original) 
metaphor, one should also consider that, as metaphoric comprehension is a 
process of matching a topic to a vehicle, or of expanding a categorisation, in 
the case of novel metaphor such a connection must first be established by 
the hearers in order for them to understand it. Our metaphorical 
understanding is supported by our ubiquitous knowledge base, such as 
conventional metaphors, and within linguistic knowledge, we interpret a
sentence metaphorically, at least at the moment of receiving it, only using our 
episodic knowledge after some moments of conscious thinking. Thus, 
metaphorical understanding seems to be drifting closer to analogical thinking.
When talking about the partial nature of metaphorical structuring, claiming 
that only some aspects of a concept are used for understanding another, 
Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 53) also mention what happens to the “unused” 
part of a metaphor. They distinguish between literal and figurative (or 
imaginative) metaphorical expressions, which can, however, all be part of a 
15 in Forceville 1997 linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S037821669789399X
16 http://kyoumu.educ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/cogpsy/personal/Kusumi/kusumi.html
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single general metaphorical concept. For instance, the expression ‘he has 
triggered a process of re-thinking’ would be an acceptable, literal everyday 
expression, while ‘he has shouldered the rifle of innovation’ would be 
figurative (or non-literal). The authors also differentiate between three 
subspecies of imaginative metaphor, which are constructed either through 
extensions of the used part, through instances of the unused part of a literal 
metaphor, or through the coining of a novel metaphor, i.e. one that is not 
normally used to structure our conceptual system but rather a new way of 
thinking. Of course, all linguistic expressions used to characterise general 
metaphorical concepts must needs be figurative by nature as the fact that 
they only partially describe another concept takes them beyond the realm of 
the merely literal. However, some strike us as very normal as we constantly 
use them in our thinking and talking (and they have become an integral part 
of our everyday lives) while others are marginal, more idiosyncratic, and not 
bound within a conceptual system but rather stand alone and isolated. Which 
part of a concept is used, is established by convention and depends on the 
respective language and culture, and such metaphors do not interact with 
others. In her study, Rachel Giora tests the claims of psycholinguists that 
understanding metaphor “does not involve a special process, and that it is 
essentially identical to understanding literal language” (1997: 1). She is 
especially interested in whether figurative language involves processing the 
surface literal meaning and claims that its comprehension is not processing-
intensive, as it does not require a trigger. She also maintains that figurative 
and literal language uses are both governed by the general principle of 
salience, that is, salient meanings (e.g. conventional, frequent, familiar, 
enhanced by prior context) are processed first:
Thus, for example, when the most salient meaning is intended (as 
in, e.g., the figurative meaning of conventional idioms), it is 
accessed directly, without having to process the less salient 
(literal) meaning first (Gibbs 1980). However, when a less rather 
than a more salient meaning is intended (e.g., the metaphoric 
meaning of novel metaphors, the literal meaning of conventional 
idioms, or a novel interpretation of a highly conventional literal 
expression) comprehension seems to involve a sequential 
process, upon which the more salient meaning is processed 
initially, before the intended meaning is derived (Blasko and 
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Connine 1993; Gerrig 1989; Gibbs 1980; Gregory and Mergler 
1990). Parallel processing is induced when more than one 
meaning is salient. For instance, conventional metaphors whose 
metaphoric and literal meanings are equally salient, are processed 
initially both literally and metaphorically (Blasko and Connine 
1993). The direct/sequential process debate, then, can be 
reconciled: different linguistic expressions (salient-less salient) 
may tap different (direct/parallel/sequential) processes. 
(Giora 1997: 1)17
Giora (among others) has proposed the Graded Salience Hypothesis, which 
claims that salient meanings are processed before less salient ones18. A 
meaning of a word or an expression is considered salient if it can be retrieved 
directly from the lexicon. According to this hypothesis, the processing of 
familiar metaphors (with a minimum of two salient interpretations, i.e. the 
literal and the metaphoric) should activate both their metaphoric and literal 
meanings, regardless of the type of context in which they are embedded, 
while processing less familiar metaphors (which have only one salient 
meaning, namely, the literal) activates the literal meaning in both cases. 
Nevertheless, in the literally biased context it is the only one referred to. The 
processing of familiar idioms, however, in a context leaning towards the 
idiomatic meaning almost exclusively evokes their figurative meaning, since 
their figurative meaning is much more salient than their literal meaning. Still, 
processing less familiar idioms in an idiomatic context activates both their 
literal and idiomatic meanings, because both meanings enjoy similar salience 
status. Giora states that in a context leaning towards the literal, familiar 
idioms evoke their more salient idiomatic meaning far more than less familiar 
idioms do, and that the findings of various tests support the graded salience 
hypothesis, also revealing that, contrary to current beliefs, metaphor 
17 Giora, Rachel, Understanding figurative and literal language: The graded salience 
hypothesis. Cognitive Linguistics, 7/1, 183-206, 1997. [PDF]
18 A meaning of a word or an expression is salient if it is coded, i.e., retrievable from the 
mental lexicon (e.g., the literal meaning of novel metaphors but not their intended, non-literal 
meaning made available by context). Factors contributing to degree of salience are 
conventionality, frequency, familiarity, and prototypicality. Prior context may be instrumental, 
but it has a limited role. It may facilitate activation of a word's meaning(s), but it can hardly 
inhibit activation of salient meanings (cf. Giora and Balaban 2001: 116)
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interpretation involves the processing of literal meaning, and that metaphor 
and literal interpretations do not involve equivalent processes. 
In their edition of 2003, Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 264) have made some 
revisions of their original division of metaphors into the three types 
orientational, ontological, and structural, rather saying that all metaphors are 
structural in that they map structures to structures; all are ontological in that 
they create target entities, and many are orientational in that they map 
orientational image-schemas. The authors admit to failing to recognise the 
profound importance of primary metaphor, as often people tend to learn 
about the target concept before the source domain, and connect a physical 
experience to the metaphor, which renders it a primary one. Later, through 
knowledge and experience, such primary metaphors are extended. In his 
essay The contemporary theory of metaphor Lakoff provides an explanation 
of his own research results that contradicts "certain assumptions that were 
widely taken for granted in 1977" (2003: 204). These assumptions are a set 
of traditionally wrong claims that stem partly from the idea that "what is literal 
is not metaphorical" (ibid.), maintaining that (1) everyday language is only 
literal; (2) everything can be described and understood without using 
metaphors; (3) only literal use can be true or false; (4) lexical definitions are 
always literal; and that (5) the concepts used in grammar are all literal (ibid.). 
Lakoff then illustrates that there are a vast number of irreducible 
metaphorical concepts in our everyday life that function systematically, 
grounded in our physical and cultural experience. 
Nogales (1999: 6) points out that metaphor needs to be regarded from both a 
semantic (i.e. the propositional content expressed by a metaphorical 
utterance is its metaphorical content) and a pragmatic (i.e. extralinguistic 
knowledge is required for deriving this content) perspective, including the 
notions of meaning, content, and speaker intention. However, it should also 
be seen from the angle of the conceptualisation of literal language use, as 
metaphor is primarily a matter of reconceptualisation, an essentially pre-
linguistic phenomenon that underlies language use. For her, “the 
metaphorical and the literal form a continuum rather than existing as 
noncontinguous sets”, so her approach of reconceptualisation somehow 
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straddles the view of metaphoricity as either semantic/pragmatic or else non-
linguistic. Nogales (1999: 10) raises the question of how we recognise a 
metaphorical utterance in the first place, providing examples such as, “Steve 
is a sheep dog”, “he lives without a doorbell or a window”, or “the ham 
sandwich wants a cup of coffee.” Her analysis, which is based on a 
philosophical rather than a psychological approach, yields some rather 
interesting and unusual results: Nogales claims that reconceptualisation, 
based on concepts in our minds, is embodied in a kind of “naïve 
metaphysics” which is challenged by figurative language use (1999: 10). 
Literal utterances are understood as such because they are consistent with a 
standardised conceptualisation underlying their use, in the shape of a 
standardised taxonomy. This view is shared by Booth (in Sacks 1981: 173), 
who maintains that “what metaphor is can never be determined with a single 
answer”; rather, we need taxonomies of a concept, not single definitions, in 
order to be able to understand the mapping process that goes on in the 
human mind. A consistency check helps us to derive what the speaker is 
actually saying, and to identify the exact degree of metaphoricity of an 
utterance. The more metaphorical an expression, the less it is consistent with 
this taxonomy, i.e. the conception underlying language use. Instead, the 
comprehension of a metaphorical utterance (e.g. “Steve is a sheepdog”) 
requires us to reconstruct the underlying concepts, to reconceptualise both, 
using Black’s terminology19, the metaphor vehicle (a sheep dog is a canine) 
and the metaphor subject (Steve is human), and thus rule out the aspects
specified by a literal interpretation as they are obviously inconsistent with 
them. At this point Nogales (1999: 11) defines reconceptualisation as the 
selection and suppression of features in order to individuate something and 
argues that this process is governed by the role an entity plays within a 
system (which she defines as a “related group of entities” that are part of our 
naïve metaphysics), and with regard to its relationship with the system20. 
19 Black in Johnson (ed) 1981: 63-82.
20 This reflects Lakoff and Johnson’s (2003) claim that, in the process of comprehending 
metaphor, we select certain aspects of it while dismissing others, i.e. the so-called unused 
part of the metaphor. Black describes this process as that of applying a system of associated 
commonplaces of the subsidiary subjects (the metaphor vehicle) to the principal subject by 
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Nogales (1999: 20) holds that, while proposing that metaphoricity is NOT a 
matter of meaning (sic!)21, it is not determined by a speaker’s intention to 
speak metaphorically but stems from the relationship between the class 
represented by the metaphor vehicle in its literal sense, and the class the 
term refers to in its metaphorical sense. In her analysis of metaphor, 
therefore, the metaphoricity of a given utterance lies in the reconstruction of 
the concepts implied; consequently, it arises from the  change in one’s 
conception of some or all the entities (literally) referenced by the utterance 
(Nogales 1999: 21). So, despite the strong connection between the literal and 
the metaphorical, there is a fundamental difference between the two, which, 
in Nogales’ terms, is based upon the class reconceptualisation that must 
needs take place, and the different truth conditions they entail (depending on 
the class to which the subject of the metaphorical utterance is assigned 
membership). In case of a metaphor, the truth conditions are not given by the 
rules of a language, as in its literal paraphrase, but must be inferred by the 
listener, through the class definition, by reconceptualising the metaphorical 
vehicle in a process of abstraction (Nogales 1999: 29). A new taxonomy, or 
better, a new category scheme, with its corresponding inclusion and 
exclusion, accentuation and de-emphasis of certain features, is proposed as 
the better means of understanding the metaphorical subject (1999: 30). 
2.1.4. Metaphor and metonymy
The distinction between metaphor and metonymy is often confusing and 
difficult to comprehend; Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 265) define the difference 
as follows:
selecting, emphasising, suppressing, and organising the features of the respective subject 
(Black 1981:78, in Nogales 1999:42).
21 The essay by Jerry Morgan, “Observations on the pragmatics of metaphor”, agrees with 
Searle's approach, stressing the necessity for pragmatic rules in the belief that "talking of 
metaphor as a kind of meaning is a mistake itself" (In Ortony 1993: 127). 
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• Metaphor involves two domains, i.e. the source domain (i.e. the 
metaphor vehicle22) that provides the concepts for the reasoning 
process, and the target domain (i.e. the metaphor subject or topic), 
which consists in the matter at hand which we aim to understand. 
Metaphorical expressions have a literal meaning in the source domain, 
and the mapping is usually multiple, which means that at least two 
elements are mapped onto at least two other elements. The mapping 
also serves to preserve the image-schemas of the source domain, e.g. 
inside stays inside, source remains source, etc. 
• Metonymy involves but one domain, which is the immediate subject 
matter, and one mapping, for which the source is mapped to the 
referent, the metonymic target, so that one element of a domain 
stands for another. Metonymy arises from correlations between two 
physical entities, such as pars-pro-toto, synecdoche, or OBJECT FOR 
USER, or between a physical entity and something that is 
metaphorically conceptualised as a physical entity (cf. Lakoff and 
Johnson 2003: 59). In other words, we use one entity to refer to 
another, related entity. Lakoff (1987: 77) calls metonymy a “basic 
characteristic of cognition” and states that it is common for people to 
take a well-understood or easy-to-perceive aspect of something and 
use it to stand either for the thing as a whole (pars pro toto) or some 
other aspect or part or it. Thus this process follows general principles, 
albeit different from the ones involved in the comprehension of 
metaphor. 
Confusion mainly arises from the fact that in both cases a conceptual 
mapping takes place that is reflected in language, even if the processes 
involved are different. Therefore, when distinguishing between the two, one 
should look at how the expression is used, rather than simply at the 
meanings of a single linguistic expression, and whether it involves two 
domains or not. If the latter form a single subject matter with a single 
mapping procedure, it is metonymy; if the domains are used separately, 
22 “The metaphor vehicle is the entity used by the speaker to convey an understanding of the 
metaphor subject” (Nogales 1999: 13). 
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involving more than just one mapping, and if one forms the subject matter 
(the target) while the other (source) provides the basis for inference, it is 
metaphor. Furthermore, the main function of metaphor is to aid 
understanding, while metonymy has a primarily referential function (Lakoff 
and Johnson 2003: 36), even if it also provides understanding. However, it 
allows us to focus more on particular aspects of the concept we are referring 
to. Like metaphor, it is not just a matter of language but of thought and 
action, too, and neither is it arbitrary or randomly assigned. Metonymic 
concepts are as systematic as metaphorical ones as they allow us to 
conceptualise one thing in terms of its relation to another, and they are also 
grounded in our experience. 
Conceptual metaphor and metonymy can combine to yield complex and 
novel images; however, the different image-schemata which languages 
employ to represent the same referential situation can reflect the different 
saliency that is generally given to functional relationships (Kuteva and Sinha, 
in Schwarz 1994: 220). 
The question about the exact difference between metaphor and ellipsis, or 
rather metonymy and ellipsis, may arise at this point. Nogales’ sample 
sentence “The ham sandwich wants a coffee” (1999: 9) is not a metaphor or 
metonym as it does not involve the reconceptualisation of a ham sandwich in 
terms of its role and subsequent application to the customer, or of the 
customer in terms of a sandwich and its characteristics. Neither would we 
regard the sandwich as a part of the customer’s (as in pars-pro-toto). Rather, 
we seem to add mentally something like “the man who ordered a ham 
sandwich” etc., which makes the utterance elliptical. Furthermore, once a 
metaphor is firmly and conventionally linked to its “metaphorical meaning”, so 
that it comes to mean something in addition to its original meaning, it ceases 
to be a metaphor. Nogales’ example of this process is the expression “to kick 
the bucket”, which, once it comes to mean “to die”, ceases to be 
metaphorical and becomes an idiom (Nogales 1999: 74), Therefore, the test 
of metaphoricity is the degree to which the original meaning is active in the 
comprehension of the utterance. 
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2.1.5. Meaning
Meaning is a shaky edifice we build out of 
scraps, dogmas, childhood injuries, newspaper articles,
 chance remarks, old films, small victories, people hated, people loved.
 Perhaps it is because our sense of what is the case
 is constructed from such inadequate materials
 that we defend it so fiercely, even to the death.23
At this point, a short treatment of meaning might come in useful to make 
some issues clearer, especially in view of my chosen subject matter, the 
Satanic Verses, the reception of which has been vastly differentiated; what 
was Rushdie’s intention, or is that even important? How did his countrymen 
or other Muslims, respectively, receive it and how did the rest of the world 
react to this supposed blasphemy? 
In his treatise of Symbolic Logic (1958: 165, in “The Annotated Alice”
1960/2000: 225), Carroll himself says that “any writer of a book is fully 
authorised in attaching any meaning he likes to any word or phrase he 
intends to use”.24 This is based upon the assumption that meaning is only 
concerned with words as lexical items, but of course meaning is also an 
issue above the word level, as word order can change the meaning of a 
sentence (even if grammatical processes never initiate meaning, as 
Widdowson (1996: 53) points out, but act upon meaning already lexically 
provided), or below it, in that morphemes are also meaningful. 
Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 201) attach meaning to experiential concepts that 
structure our thinking processes and emphasise that meaning can never 
exist independent of human understanding, but nowhere do they define what 
meaning as such really is. However, they talk about a theory of meaning that 
is “based on a theory of truth” (ibid.) and quote David Lewis’ definition (on the 
sentence level), “A meaning for a sentence is something that determines the 
23 Rushdie, Salman, Imaginary Homelands, in: Imaginary Homelands, 1981-1991, Granta 
Books, p 12
24 We are reminded of Humpty Dumpty’s famous ditty: “’When I use a word’, Humpty Dumpty 
said, in a rather scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean ???????????????????
less.’
’The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’
The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master––that’s all.’”
Carroll’s “The Annotated Alice” (1960/2000: 224)
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conditions under which the sentence is true or false”25. Truth, the basis of 
meaning, here is defined in terms of “fitting the world”. I am going to give a 
more detailed account of the objectivist myths of meaning and metaphor 
further below. 
Despite many centuries of study, we still know very little about the true nature 
of meaning, or how it is represented in the human mind. Some of the better-
known proposals include connotation (defined by O’Grady as the “set of 
associations the use of a certain word can evoke”, O’Grady 1996: 273), 
denotation (or, according to O’Grady, ibid, the “referents”, the attempt to 
“equate the meaning of a word or phrase with the entities to which it refers”, 
or as Widdowson (1996: 21) puts it, the “aspects of reality encoded as 
semantic components in linguistic form”), extension (the set of referents) and 
intension (inherent sense, concepts evoked), and semantic decomposition 
(or componential analysis, which Widdowson (1996: 127) defines as “the 
decomposition of lexical items into their basic elements of meaning”). Most 
approaches to meaning seem to relate meaning to concepts in the human 
mind; the problem, however, still lies in the definition of a concept as such. At 
this point, therefore, it might be helpful to try and define what a concept 
actually is. 
Concepts form a system in our minds that underlies our use of words and 
sentences to express a certain meaning. This system organises and 
classifies every aspect of our experience, from feelings and perceptions to 
social and cultural phenomena and our physical world. The study of our 
conceptual system reveals how we express meaning through language, 
especially through the way these concepts are structured, extended, and 
interrelated (cf. O’Grady 1996: 276). Basically, we need to understand that 
concepts are rarely straightforward with clear-cut boundaries, but rather that 
they are usually fuzzy, and that their members can be graded in terms of 
their typicality. This even applies to concepts with scientifically defined 
boundaries (think of, for instance, the concept “BIRD”, as quoted by O’Grady 
1996: 277). This suggests that concepts have some kind of internal structure, 
25 Lewis, David, “General Semantics”, in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harmann, eds, 
Semantics of Natural Language, 1972: 173.
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like concentric circles with the “best” (or prototypical) example close to the 
centre and less typical specimens in its more peripheral layers. This structure 
provides a lot of insight into the nature of the human conceptual system. The 
study of metaphor, in particular, illustrates that these concepts are not used
isolated from each other but that “they make up a giant network, with many 
interconnections and associations among the various subparts” (O’Grady 
1996: 278). 
Nogales (1999: 32) defines concepts according to the so-called Classical 
View, with both an intensional and an extensional component: A concept can 
either be defined in terms of the features an object must possess in order to 
be part of it, or else in terms of the objects that fall under it. However, being a 
summary representation, the specified features are not to be regarded as an 
exhaustive description, and they are “singly necessary and jointly sufficient” 
(ibid.) to define a concept. Nogales then modifies this view by quoting 
Wittgenstein’s alternative representation of concepts through the notion of 
family resemblance, for which class membership is not determined through 
certain properties alone but though the similarity to prototypical class 
members. Accordingly, the functionality of categorisation explains why such 
category schemes are “highly determined, mirror the correlational structure of 
the environment, and possess basic levels of categorisation” (Nogales 1999:
37). The interaction view looks at matters from a directly opposed point of 
view, saying that in the most interesting cases metaphors create similarity, 
rather than state some pre-existing similarity, thus producing new knowledge 
by projecting the knowledge associated with the secondary subject (a kind of 
a source domain) onto the primary subject (the target domain) (cf. Gola 
1993).
While, according to O’Grady (1996: 284), conceptualisation has to do with 
the meaning of individual words and phrases, meaning can be established on 
other levels, too. Halliday has distinguished four different notions of meaning 
on the sentence level. First, he isolates “certain features that can be thought 
of as representing the real world as it is apprehended in our experience” 
(1990: 19) and calls this interpretation the “experiential meaning” of a 
sentence, reflecting reality. Second, he refers to a different kind of meaning 
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encoded in the same sentence, i.e. the “interpersonal meaning”, as the 
sentence is not only representative of reality but also a piece of interaction 
between speaker and listener (Halliday 1990: 20). By combining these two 
meanings, he then arrives at the “logical meaning” of his sample sentence, 
which is the expression of fundamental logical relations within the sentence. 
Finally, he defines what makes sentences into a text as the “textual 
meaning”, representing different aspects of the texture of the quoted line, 
claims that all “these strands of meaning are interwoven in the fabric of the 
discourse” (Halliday 1990: 23) and calls his method the “functional approach” 
as every sentence of a text is multifunctional and we therefore need to regard 
it from a variety of angles, with each perspective contributing towards the 
total interpretation. Halliday’s categorisation of meaning reflects his notions of 
the “functions” of language, i.e. the ideational (subdivided into logical and 
experiential), the interpersonal, and the textual functions. 
John Lye26 investigates the issue on the text level, asking whether a literary 
work means what the author “intended” it to mean, and if so, how we can tell.  
If all we have is the text itself, we can only surmise on the exact nature of the 
author’s intentions and ideas using our interpretative practices and values. 
Lye provides a list of options for expanding our knowledge by studying other 
works by the same author, by learning more about what sort of meanings 
works in that particular tradition, time and genre seem to have in common, by 
investigating how the author as well as other writers and readers of that time 
used to read texts, i.e. their interpretative practices, and by finding out what 
the cultural values and symbols of the time consisted in (ibid.). 
A text can only have meaning within a framework of pre-existing, socially 
supported ideas, symbols, images, ways of thinking and values; although our 
experiences differ, as do our temperaments and interests, we interpret the 
world according to certain norms, determined by our varying social and 
cultural backgrounds. 
Although we may have at our disposal, as additional evidence for meaning, 
what the author said or wrote about his or her work, Lye warns us to rely on it 
26 http://www.brocku.ca/english/jlye/meaning.html
Lye, John, “The Problem of Meaning in Literature”, 1996
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too much, as an author's ways of using literary conventions are cultural, and 
often his or her writing has taken a direction totally different from the one s/he 
had originally planned, and developed meanings which s/he had never 
intended. Moreover, Lye claims that a work of literature may embody cultural 
or symbolic meanings that emerge only through regarding them from a 
historical or another cultural perspective.
Answering his own question of whether the meaning of a text resides in the 
text itself, Lye argues that “the formal properties of the text, i.e. the grammar, 
the language, the uses of image and so forth, contain and produce the 
meaning, so that any educated (competent) reader will inevitably come to 
essentially the same interpretation” (ibid.). He then questions the possibility 
of our finding out if the text is actually interpreted in the same way as 
meaning is encoded by the formal properties involved, and as the above-
mentioned “competent readers” were all taught to read the formal properties 
of a text in more or less the same way. As all meanings are strongly 
grounded in culture, the claim that meaning is inside a text does not convince 
him27. Rather, he argues that meaning is based on certain conventions, 
traditions, “the cultural codes which have been handed down, so that insofar 
as we and other readers (and the author) might be said to agree on the 
meaning of the text, that agreement would be created by common traditions 
and conventions of usage, practice and interpretation” (ibid.). 
Lye’s “competent readers” will interpret one and the same text in different 
ways, depending on when they read it, who they are and where they come 
from (their “class, gender, ethnicity, belief and world-view”, ibid.), and why 
they are reading a text. A text must be regarded from two different 
perspectives: from the historical, and from the cultural as meaning cannot be 
separated from culture and context. Consequently, it becomes very difficult to 
find out what a text “really means”, especially what it means to a particular 
reader, group or tradition (ibid.). 
Lye then queries whether meaning, then, exists in a reader's response, 
processing or reception of a text as this would be somehow inevitable: 
Meaning exists only relative to the way people function in the world and 
27 http://www.brocku.ca/english/jlye/meaning.html
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understand it, and therefore it must always be meaning to someone (cf. 
Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 217). 
Lye comes to three essential conclusions (cf. Lye 199328), which all have 
important effects on the interpretation of metaphors in any work of literature: 
1. Meaning is “social”, i.e., language and conventions collaborate 
to produce it. When we read a text, we are participating in 
social, or cultural, meaning. Response (to a work of literary art, 
or any other text) is not merely an individual thing but part of 
our culture and history. 
2. Meaning is contextual; if you alter the context, you often alter 
the meaning (which also has huge implications for translating). 
3. Texts written as works of art follow their own codes and 
categories, and the more we know of literary devices and 
practices or of a particular genre, the better we can decode the 
text, or understand it––consequently, the matter of meaning is 
bound to the question of reader competency.
Meaning is cultural and a phenomenon that is not easily ascribed or located; 
it is historical, social, and derived from the traditions of reading and thinking 
and understanding the world in which a person is educated and socialized 
(cf. Lye 1993). Moreover, meaning can never be separated from experience 
and thus be assigned arbitrarily, as Saussure and others maintained, or at 
least implied (cf. R Dirven in Schwarz 1994: 131). More often than not, 
meanings are construals made by human beings in a given setting, and 
therefore subject to culture-specific categorisation. Lyons (1977: 643, in 
Palmer 1981: 8) has made a useful distinction in terms of “sentence 
meaning”, referring to the grammatical and lexical features of a sentence, 
and “utterance meaning”, which also comprises other aspects of meaning, 
especially those related to context. It is this distinction that permits us to ‘say’ 
one thing but ‘mean’ another. 
28 http://www.brocku.ca/english/jlye/meaning.html
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So, how does meaning affect the phenomenon of metaphor, apart from 
being, as Palmer (1981: 103) puts it, “fairly haphazard”? As already 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Nogales (1999: 42) claims that metaphor 
is NOT a matter of meaning. In this, she contradicts Black, who claims that 
metaphor is mainly a matter of meaning. Thus, when using a metaphor, we 
have two thoughts of different things acting together and supported by a 
single word or phrase, the meaning of which is the result of this interaction. 
This aspect of Black’s theory has caused it to be classified as an interaction 
theory of metaphor as it regards metaphorical meaning as the result of the 
interaction between the meanings of the principal and subsidiary subjects (cf. 
Nogales 1999: 42). Black’s theory of metaphor is a semantic theory, as are in 
fact most of the traditional ones since they account for metaphor in terms of 
metaphorical meaning, holding that metaphors express a metaphorical 
content different from that expressed by the literal interpretation of an 
utterance. However, the main drawback of semantic theories of metaphor lies 
in their disability to explain how this metaphorical meaning ties in with literal 
meaning, and how it interacts in the comprehension of an utterance. Some 
authors (such as Fogelin) claim that the meaning of a given term changes 
when the context changes, giving rise to the so-called meaning-shift theories 
of metaphor, which are also based on the distinction between meaning 
(semantics, or meaning in language) and use (pragmatics, or how 
Widdowson (1996: 61) defines it, ”[…] what people mean by the language 
they use, how they actualise its meaning potential as a communicative 
resource”). 
Recently, the focus of metaphor theory has shifted to the latter, which 
regards metaphor as a phenomenon of conversation, that is, spoken 
discourse. Davidson (1991: 430, in Nogales 1999: 62), among others, 
strongly rejects any semantic interpretation of metaphor, claiming that 
“metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, 
and nothing more”. For him, metaphor is a matter of use, and of learning. 
Nogales (1999: 63), by contrast, formulates a view of metaphor that 
integrates both its semantic and pragmatic elements while still preserving 
some of the traditional distinctions (between meaning and use, or between 
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meaning and content, respectively), thus establishing further criteria for an 
analysis of metaphor: the intuition for metaphorical content and truth, and the 
need for consistency with the framework provided by semantics and 
pragmatics. In his “Ten Literal Theses” (in Sacks 1981: 173), Booth states 
that what a metaphor means always depends on the respective content. He 
calls this phenomenon “shades of meaning” (in semantics known as 
“connotation”), and refers to the hearer’s interpretation as part of it. While it 
applies to all spoken discourse, in the case of metaphor it is particularly 
strong, as metaphors are much richer in meaning, i.e. all that is 
communicated by a speaker or effected by an utterance, respectively.  
2.1.6. Other philosophical aspects 
a good metaphor implies an intuitive
 perception of the similarities in dissimilars
(Aristotle, “Poetics”)
Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]) wrote their book “Metaphors We Live By” 
as a reaction to the claims made by two major American philosophers of our 
time: Donald Davidson, who claimed that all metaphor is without meaning, 
and John Searle, who averred that certain semantic and pragmatic principles 
underlie the process of assigning literal meaning to metaphorical sentences. 
Both these arguments are based on the common assumptions of analytic 
philosophy and Western tradition, i.e. that concepts are always “conscious, 
literal, and disembodied, that is, not crucially shaped by the body and brain” 
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 271)––which has been profoundly refuted by 
more recent findings. 
Traditionally, metaphor used to be rather unpopular with philosophers 
throughout the centuries, with a few exceptions (such as Aristotle). The main 
reason for this fact could have been its vagueness of reference, as 
expressed in, for instance, Romeo’s famous saying “Juliet is the sun”. 
Without the knowledge that Romeo is deeply in love, we would have difficulty 
assigning the right qualities to Juliet––either the sun’s destructive or its life-
giving attributes––and this lack of precision makes the expression difficult to 
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articulate and evaluate. Nogales (1999: 79) explains that metaphor does not 
usually specify which properties of the metaphor subject are being 
predicated, which renders an interpretation (and therefore paraphrase) of it 
extremely difficult (and any translation of it often downright impossible).
As Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 244-246) have found out, four major historical 
fallacies exist, and they can all be traced back to Aristotle’s view on 
metaphor. The first is that metaphor resides in words, not concepts; the 
second, that it is based on similarity instead of cross-domain correlations in 
our experience; third, that concepts are necessarily literal, not metaphorical; 
and fourth, that rational thought is never affected by our mental and physical 
makeup (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 244). The authors deplore the fact that 
“[…] these age-old, a priori philosophical views are so deeply ingrained that 
they blind many readers to any evidence to the contrary” (2003: 245). Kant, 
also in the objectivist tradition, claimed that we can acquire a universally valid 
knowledge and moral laws by using our universal reason. Although his 
approach was a synthesis of rationalism and empiricism, this is what made it 
fall within the objectivist sphere, despite his statement that the knowledge of 
a thing per se is denied to us (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 195). Other 
philosophical traditions, all in the objectivist way of thinking, have claimed 
that meaning is objective, disembodied, compositional (building-block theory) 
and independent of use and human understanding, and that grammar is
independent of meaning and understanding, which is epitomised by the 
linguistic hypotheses put forward by Noam Chomsky, who maintains that 
grammar is merely a matter of form (just consider his distinction between 
‘competence’ and ‘performance’). 
Fortunately, empirical research has provided a wealth of evidence of the 
structuring role that metaphor plays in abstract thought processes, even if the 
above assumptions are extremely difficult to eradicate even in this 
enlightened day and age. Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 222) came to the 
conclusion that the objectivist views are incapable of providing a satisfactory 
account of human understanding in a number of issues, such as:
- the human conceptual system and rationality 
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- language and communication
- the sciences (psychology, anthropology, sociology, linguistics)
- moral / aesthetic values
- understanding scientific concepts
- the grounding of mathematics etc. in human understanding
and say that “the basic elements of an experientialist account of 
understanding––interactional properties, experiential gestalts29, and 
metaphorical concepts––seem to be necessary for any adequate treatment 
of these human issues” (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 223).
29 Interestingly, the German word Gestalt, very common to any psychologist, is one of those 
that are impossible to translate, so it has become a German loan word in the English 
language. Rheingold (2000: 249) has defined gestalten as “little wholes that make up larger 
wholes” or “integrated structures or patterns that must be apprehended as wholes rather 
than disconnected parts” (p 250), and points out that our perception of such a gestalt, visual 
or otherwise, significantly influences our interpretation of the object perceived. Another 
important point is that the gestalt is always greater than the sum of its part, e.g. in music, the 
notes that make up the melody. 
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2.2. Translation theory
Übersetzen heißt, in Ketten tanzen
(Heinrich Heine)30
There still tends to be a gap between practical translating and a theory of 
translation as such––if the latter exists at all. Mary Snell-Hornby (1986: 12) 
postulates translation science as a separate discipline. She regards it as an 
“interdisciplinary, multi-perspective entity that is based on the complex reality 
of actual translating and not on the axiomatic models of linguistics and is 
characterised by its reconciliatory view” (ibid.). While she deplores the fact 
that linguistics seems to ignore the voice of the craft itself, rather tending to 
underestimate the latter, Snell-Hornby suggests trying to close the wide gap 
yawning between theory and practice as translation is in urgent need of 
gaining practical relevance through scientific reflection. This could be done 
by letting go of purely linguistic models (such as Koller’s substitution theory, 
where the elements a1, a2, a3… from language inventory L1 are replaced 
with elements b1, b2, b3… from language inventory L2)31, which Snell-
Hornby strongly rejects, claiming that the translator is more than a simple 
‘switchboard operator’ or ‘interface’ (Schaltstelle––another tricky metaphor to 
translate…). Text is not linear but a gestalt, an entity which is more than 
simply the sum of its components, and language never occurs in a vacuum 
but always in a specific situation within a cultural framework. Therefore, the 
translator recreates the text, on the basis of the given conditions (Snell-
Hornby 1986: 13). 
The absence of a viable theory has more or less reduced translating to an 
“act of faith”, as Tabakowska (1993: 2) has put it, who also stresses that 
cognitive linguistics and literary studies are mutually dependent. Indeed, the 
common objective of both linguistics and poetics seems to lie in an 
explanation of the factors that motivate personal choices––in our case, the 
30 “Translating means dancing in chains”; Stolze, Radegundis. 1986. "Zur Bedeutung von 
Hermeneutik und Textlinguistik beim Übersetzen". In Snell-Hornby, Mary (ed), 
Übersetzungswissenschaft. Tübingen: Francke, 13–160.
31 Koller 1972: 69 quoted in Snell-Hornby 1986: 13.
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writer’s as much as the translator’s. Additionally, a link between cognitive 
linguistics and translation theory as such needs to be established for the 
purpose of this paper. 
2.2.1. “Inseln der Gemeinsamkeiten32”
To focus exclusively on the act of transcoding means that the multiple 
perspectives of language and text are disregarded––but most translators will 
bear out the fact that translation is much more than simple transcoding, and it 
is therefore not surprising that no useful definition of what a ‘good’ (i.e., 
successful) translation is like has been found so far. Translation does not 
work with single, isolated units but rather weaves a net of interrelations 
between these units or words, based on their contextual relevance and 
respective function in the entire text (cf. Snell-Hornby 1986: 14-16). 
Vermeer (in Snell-Hornby 1986: 33) corroborates this view, emphasising that 
the translator never merely transcodes a text from one language into another. 
Rather, translation is a complex action where somebody “reports” about a 
text (original state of affairs) under new functional, cultural and linguistic 
conditions within a new situation, also endeavouring formally to emulate the 
original text as closely as possible. Eco (2003: 3) calls this “the translator’s 
ethical obligation to respect what the author has written”, and translation a 
“disguised indirect discourse”. For Vermeer, a translation mostly depends on 
the purpose of the target text, apart from the characteristics of the translator, 
as this purpose is also an element of the target culture. This means that 
translation is cultural transfer (see also below) plus a personal feat of the 
translator’s, and that it cannot ever be “finished” or objective, rather 
remaining a matter of taste and personal preference––especially in belletrist 
fiction, as in our case. Vermeer even goes so far as to maintain that there is 
no real (qualitative) difference between translating fiction and other texts, as 
translation is always, per definitionem, teleological, i.e., purpose-orientated.
32 “Islands of similarities”
40
2.2.2. Is there any such thing as real equivalence? 
The word ‘translation’ comes, etymologically, from
 the Latin ‘bearing across’. Having been borne across
 the world, we are translated men.
 It is normally supposed that something
 always gets lost in translation;
 I cling, obstinately, to the notion
 that something can also be gained. 33
Often a word might mean the same in another language on the surface but 
‘feels’ differently. Still, the concept of equivalence has been a focal issue in 
all theories of translation, some considering it as a crucial theoretical notion, 
others rejecting it as either an illusion, an unattainable target of translation, or 
simply renaming it ‘functional adequacy’ (which is equally vague a term). 
Those who support the idea of equivalence either tacitly assume that it exists 
(“similarity of response”, Tabakowska 1993: 2), or else acknowledge it 
explicitly, referring to equivalents as “meaning invariants” (ibid.). Tabakowska 
(1993: 3) tries to justify the claim that equivalence in literary translation 
should be defined in terms of poetics (i.e. a particular function of language, a 
way of structuring information within a text) and, in a more holistic approach, 
attempts to keep the concept of equivalence on the level of textual structure, 
which is also proposed by Snell-Hornby (1988: 19), who avers that 
equivalence has a certain dialectic tension. 
Apart from the concepts of terminological (“begriffliche”) and situational 
equivalence, for which only linguistic signs, deep structural units or 
sentences are compared, Burgschmidt and Götz (1974: 90) added another 
three criteria against which a text must be checked prior to its translation into 
another language: (i) the register34 (“variety of language related to the wider 
social role played by the performer at the moment of utterance, e.g. 
33 Rusdhie, Salman, Imaginary Homelands, in: Imaginary Homelands, 1981-1991, Granta 
Books, p 17
34 Halliday (1990) refers to register as a semantic concept, which “can be defined as a 
configuration of meanings that are typically associated with a particular situational 
configuration” and must also “include the expressions, the lexico-grammatical and 
phonological features, that typically accompany or REALISE these meanings” and 
sometimes “indexical features, indices in the form of particular words, particular grammatical 
signals, or even sometimes phonological signals that have the function of indicating to the 
participants that this is the register in question” (1990: 38, 39).
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‘scientific’, ‘religious’, ‘civil service’ etc.”), (ii) the style (relationship between 
speaker and listener, speaker’s intentions with regard to listener), and (iii) the 
medium (spoken or written language) (ibid.). 
Interestingly, the term itself is used differently in different languages, or even 
within one and the same language. Looking at the German Äquivalenz, one 
will find that, while contrastive linguistics uses it for the relations between 
lexical units, in translation theory it refers to all sorts of relationships on the 
word, sentence or even textual level. 
Paradoxically, ‘Äquivalenz’ is not the same as ‘equivalence’. While the former 
was not to be found in any dictionary before the 1960s, the latter has been in 
use as a scientific term (of e.g. mathematics, formal logics) for about 150 
years, denoting an ‘umkehrbar eindeutige Zuordnung’, a ‘reversibly clear 
allocation’ (Snell-Hornby, in Snell-Hornby 1986: 15). However, to make 
already confusing matters even more complicated, it was also mentioned as 
early as 1460 in the OED as both a sharply delineated technical term of 
science AND an oscillating word of everyday English (in the meaning “of 
similar significance” or “virtually the same thing”, i.e. relative in a quantitative 
sense). Translation theory is leaning more towards the latter usage of 
equivalence, but at the same time striving to retain the important concept of 
reversibility. However, ‘equivalent’ and ‘gleichwertig’ are not necessarily the 
same, either, again rendering the entire hypothesising rather useless. 
Therefore, Mary Snell-Hornby (1986: 15) has come to the conclusion that 
neither word makes a lot of sense in translation science as the German term 
is too static and one-dimensional while the English counterpart is too hazy 
and wishy-washy (“similarity”) and does not solve the problem of interlingual 
blurring.
A reconciliation of practical efficiency and theoretical adequacy is called for, 
says Neubert (in Snell-Hornby 1986: 85). He criticises the modular concept of 
equivalence, where isolated language units are “set off” against each other, 
and proposes an “interactional” approach to equivalence, focusing on textual 
meaning, which is global. Translation is always a search for the “Inseln der 
Gemeinsamkeiten”, the ‘isles of similarities’ in a ‘vast sea of differences’ 
(Neubert, in Snell-Hornby 1986: 88). However, the above problem still 
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remains: These ‘isles of invariance’ are relative, again depending on 
someone’s personal choice, and therefore give space for great difference 
between two or even more “good” translations of the same piece of text. In 
conclusion, Neubert (ibid.) quotes de Bono (1979: 146), who referred to 
translating as an act of “lateral thinking”, a practical process of creativity 
which turns creativity itself into a tool for the translator. 
By stressing the importance of paraphrase, Paepcke (in Snell-Hornby 1986:
129) provides another solution: The complex problem, for him, lies in total 
meaning as composed of idiomatic meaning and its paraphrase35. Idiomatic 
paraphrasing is based on the rule that everything an author has meant, 
thought and formulated when writing a text also has to be formulated by the 
translator in the course of its translation: “Paraphrasen sind die 
sinnerhaltende Wiedergabe von Satzbedeutungen bei vielfach eintretendem 
Perspektivenwandel” (i.e. “paraphrases reflect the original meaning of 
sentences while often changing the perspectives involved”, in Snell-Hornby 
1986: 129). Therefore, a paraphrase is the interpreted and re-worded 
rendering of the original text, provided that the translator has comprehended 
the latter. Thus, the denotative core meaning contained in the original 
wording is retained:
Die Paraphrase dient vorzugsweise der Überwindung der in 
unterschiedlich gestalteten Texten notwendig vorhandenen 
Divergenzen. Auf diese Weise verhindern Paraphrasen das Vorkommen 
verfehlter Sprachverwendungen. Ihre Funktion besteht darin, daß sie 
den idiomatischen Sprachgebrauch durch verbale oder nominale 
Wendungen absichern, wobei das Grundproblem des idiomatischen 
Sprachgebrauchs darin liegt, daß die einzelnen Komponenten einer 
Verbal- oder Nominalfügung auf der Ebene der Übersetzung nicht 
remantisierbar [sic!] sind.36 (Paepcke, in Snell-Hornby 1986: 130)
35 O’Grady (1996: 272) has defined paraphrases as two sentences with the same meaning, 
i.e. the same truth conditions, while there may still be some subtle differences in e.g. 
emphasis between the two. Therefore, two structures can never have exactly the same 
meaning, and paraphrase can never be perfect.  
36 i.e. “Paraphrase mainly serves to surmount the necessary divergences contained in 
differently constructed texts.  Thus, paraphrases prevent the misuse of linguistic structures. 
Their function is to ensure the idiomatic use of language through verbal or nominal phrases, 
the main problem of this idiomatic use of language lying in the fact that the individual 
components of such a nominal or verbal phrase cannot be reworded on the level of 
translation”
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However, Paepcke rejects the very idea that paraphrases might be in any 
way unclear or merely subjective, rather stressing the need for appropriate 
language use37 in translation. Macheiner (2004: 28), on the other hand, 
formulates a puzzle, as she calls it, by raising the following question: is that 
which is said in other words really the same? Of course, this has something 
to do with the complex problem of the relationship between form and content, 
and the central question to what extent the two can be separated or rather 
form an indivisible entity. She solves the problem by resigning herself to the 
fact that, by changing the form, i.e. the language, some of the original 
meaning inevitably gets lost too, and that all we can ever hope to achieve in 
translation is to get as close as possible to the original text. She also stresses 
how important it is for the translator to comprehend the entire text at the 
outset, before searching for similar expressions in another language:
Seine Fähigkeit. sich die Welt, von der der Text handelt, in allen 
angesprochenen Punkten vorstellen zu können, ist die 
Voraussetzung dafür, daß alles das, was wegen der Unterschiede 
zwischen den beteiligten Welten eigentlich nicht übersetzbar ist, 
schließlich doch irgendwie für das Verstehen der Übersetzung zur 
Verfügung steht.38 (Macheiner 2004: 29) 
This reflects another author’s, Fessenko’s, view, who maintains that another 
culture must be reflected in a way that allows the readers to visualise it 
accurately and to be able to understand these foreign forms of life and 
behaviour, categories, norms and values in terms of their own cultural 
experience (2003: 4).
 As far as metaphor is concerned, Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 136) also ask 
whether paraphrase is really possible, and if two sentences can ever mean 
exactly the same. Like Macheiner, they answer both questions in the 
negative, and point out that any change in a sentence––be it word order, 
vocabulary, grammatical construction, even intonation––necessarily alters 
37 According to Crystal (1995: 367), a usage is “appropriate” in a situation if it is performing 
the required function satisfactorily and does not draw attention to itself. 
38 i.e. “One’s ability to imagine the world evoked by a particular text in all its minute detail is 
prerequisite for being able somehow to understand all that is untranslatable, regardless of 
the differences between the two worlds involved”
44
the entire meaning of the sentence, more or less subtly. In addition, they are 
able to provide a reason why this should be so: As we conceptualise 
sentences metaphorically in spatial terms, the elements of linguistic form 
have spatial properties such as length, and relations such as closeness. This 
means, then, that the spatial metaphors of our conceptual system (like 
CLOSENESS IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT) automatically structure the 
relationship between form and content. As some aspects of meaning are not 
based on arbitrary linguistic conventions but rather on our natural inclination 
to correlate what we say with our conceptual system, the form of what we 
utter is conceptualised in spatial terms, and any alteration, or paraphrase, will 
give rise to subtle variations in meaning. Nogales (1999: 5) holds that, as 
metaphors seem to convey propositional content beyond or instead of what 
they express in actual language, it is often difficult, if not downright 
impossible, to express this content by the use of paraphrase. While the 
paraphrase of a metaphorical utterance may reflect its truth conditions, the 
metaphor conveys more than just those, something different. Nogales (1999:
6) discusses this so-called non-paraphrasability of metaphors at length and 
argues that an analysis of metaphor as reconceptualisation explains both its 
impact and use. This means that metaphor highlights our current 
conceptualisation, challenges it, and then presents an alternative, thus 
prompting us to reconceptualise. She also raises the interesting point that the 
more ‘dead’, i.e. conventionalised, a metaphor, the more easily it is 
paraphrased. In general, though, she claims that, while the cognitive content 
of a metaphor can easily be conveyed in other terms, the feeling evoked by 
the metaphorical vehicle cannot be reproduced. 
Paepcke’s definition (in Tabakowska 1993: 18) of equivalence reflects the 
one put forward by the advocates of literary theory, i.e., appropriateness of 
use (for literary works, normative characteristics such as genre, period, 
literary technique etc.), while in linguistic theory translation equivalence is 
composed of sub-equivalences (phonological, syntactic or semantic). Here, 
the assumption is that natural languages ‘converge’ at the level of deep 
structure, where the semantic identity between an original and its successful 
translation should be established in order to ‘strike the same chord’, to use a 
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perceptual metaphor, within the respective reader. This would mean that two 
sentences are regarded as equivalent if they have identical deep structure, 
while any correspondence between them on the surface level would be 
regarded as an additional bonus accounting for their congruence, but not as 
essential (cf. Tabakowska 1993: 18). 
Reflecting the prevalent Aristotelian dichotomy of ‘form’ and ‘content’, and 
thus two interrelating forms of equivalence, contrastive linguistics is more 
preoccupied with isolated sentences, tacitly assuming that translation 
equivalence exists regardless of longer textual structures. Linguistic 
pragmatics has subsequently attempted to reveal the inadequacies of such 
theories of equivalence and to replace them with the (still rather vague) 
concepts of dynamic vs. functional equivalence. However, the emotive factor 
still determines the criteria of equivalence, once again dooming them to fall 
outside the scope of linguistics as such (cf. Tabakowska 1993: 19).
Cognitive linguistics now opens totally new perspectives for translation theory 
as it offers a powerful tool for describing, comparing, and evaluating the ways 
in which two languages structure semantic content. For Tabakowska (1993:
20), the merit of cognitive linguistics does not consist in making new 
discoveries but in providing a theoretical framework for a systematic and 
coherent description of old and well-grounded intuitions. The renowned 
Italian philosopher and linguist Umberto Eco (2003: 5) may hold a more 
conservative view (but still with a cognitive angle) of equivalence, with his 
aforementioned stress on “faithfulness” to the original text: for him this means 
that translation is always a form of interpretation, and that translators need to 
aim at rendering not necessarily the intention of the respective author (who 
may have been dead for years) but rather the intention of the text, which he 
defines as “the interpretative effort on the part of the reader, the critic or the 
translator” (ibid.). I believe his approach is largely due to the fact that, having 
been at the receiving end of translation himself numerous times, he has most 
probably felt his work gaining a kind of independence, which he must have 
viewed with some misgiving. Therefore, Eco has considered many concepts 
of translation studies, such as adequacy and equivalence, from the point of 
view of negotiation, which he defines as “a process by virtue of which, in 
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order to get something, each party renounces something else, and at the end 
everybody feels satisfied since one cannot have everything” (Eco 2003: 6).  
However, when considering the great number of pitfalls of practical 
translating, he comes to the conclusion that, while equivalence might still be 
an important factor, the aim of a translation must be to create the same effect 
in a reader’s mind as the original text was meant to create. So, instead of 
speaking of “equivalence of meaning”, he now defines a “functional 
equivalence”, which refers to the fact that a “good” translation needs to 
“generate the same effect aimed at by the original” (Eco 2003: 56). This 
means that the translator has to develop a hypothesis about the intended 
original effect in order to remain faithful to its intention, to use Eco’s own 
words (ibid.); and, as this may give rise to a great number of different 
hypotheses, the decision what a translation should reproduce becomes 
negotiable. The main issue for Eco, however, is referential equivalence, 
which means that a translation must convey the same facts and events as 
the original, while literal equivalence or equivalence of meaning fades into 
the background. Still, a crucial question remains: While preserving its effect, 
how far can a text be altered without violating the equivalence in reference?
In a specific situation one language may require a different register, lexis or 
syntax than another, which is partly due to the different cultural backgrounds. 
Moreover, verbal expressions have no autonomous existence but rather 
need to be considered against a wide background of the actual knowledge, 
experience and cognitive abilities of communicating human beings. Lewis 
Carroll, the famous author of Alice, put it this way: “No word has a meaning 
inseparably attached to it; a word means what the speaker intends by it, and 
what the hearer understands by it, and that is all…” (1960/2000: 224). 
These facts have made Tabakowska (1993) favour a more dynamic 
approach, which considers text to be more a process than a product, a 
gradually emerging entity “constantly confronted with present expectations 
and past experiences of those who witness its birth” (1993: 15). This is 
mindful of Derrida’s well-known maxim “all reading involves construal”, as 
well as of deconstructivism, which obliterates all clear demarcation lines 
between text and context (just as cognitive linguistics rejects the sharp 
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distinction between semantics and pragmatics). However, I rather tend to 
agree with Nogales (1999: 91-91), who says that metaphors, as well as other 
instances of figurative speech, are clearly dependent upon context in many 
ways, even more so than literal language––be it only for defining whether an 
utterance is actually metaphorical or literal. Without appearing in a specific 
context, it can neither be identified (an epistemological issue) nor properly 
defined as a metaphor (a metaphysical issue).
Tabakowska (1993: 3) has raised another interesting point with regard to 
equivalence that should be noted: “If translation assessment is to go beyond 
mere error-hunting it requires from the analyst such proficiency in both 
languages as only few (if any) can lay claim to.” Style is choice––on both the 
writer’s and the translator’s parts. The preference of a certain expression 
reflects the writer’s choice of conceptualisation out of the array of possibilities 
provided by the linguistic conventions of a language, while the translator 
selects an expression from the many choices of the target languages, relying 
on his or her personal comprehension, i.e., interpretation of the original text. 
3. Translation of metaphor
To unlock a society, look at its untranslatable words
Salman Rushdie, Shame, p 111
Theories on the translation of metaphor have not really been an issue so far. 
Some have been proposed by Dagut, Newmark, and others, but in this paper 
I am focusing on the cognitive aspects of metaphor theory, as well as on 
other issues, such as: how important is it to retain the original image in the 
target language? Is it better to change the image in order to save the overall 
effect, or the pragmatic meaning of the metaphor? Sometimes, as Eco (2003:
47) points out, a translator has to enrich the original text in order to avoid 
missing important details (such as metaphor…)––even if saying more 
sometimes means saying less, because the translator fails to keep a crucial 
and meaningful reticence or ambiguity (2003: 50). Some concepts seem to 
refuse to travel across linguistic boundaries, and cannot be translated. 
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Nevertheless, rewriting also represents an “act of fidelity”, again in Eco’s 
words (2003: 57), or an “act of faith”, in Tabakowska’s (1993: 2, see chapter 
2), on the translator’s part if s/he aims to reproduce the original’s effect on 
the reader. The difficulty here lies in defining the extent to which a translation 
should be allowed to say what the original does not. 
In her doctoral thesis, Schmid-Gallistl (1996: 115) criticises several more 
extreme approaches, saying that, for instance, the more original a metaphor, 
the easier it is to translate is too simplistic a theory as the cultural factor can 
never be disregarded. Although she seems to favour Dagut’s method, she 
also finds fault with his classification of metaphors into three categories 
(ephemeral, one-off metaphors––unique semantic creations––metaphors that 
are used daily), all of them artificial and rather useless. Not even Mason 
earns her unqualified approval although she has focused on the meaning 
aspect with regard to metaphor, reducing its translation to the act of mere 
interpretation; Schmid-Gallistl (1996) criticises the fact that the culture factor 
is over-emphasised in Mason’s theory, thus rendering any theory of 
metaphor translation obsolete. She even goes so far as to claim that “cultural 
components just add another layer of complexity to the decoding and re-
encoding processes, but they themselves have nothing to do with the 
mechanisms governing the translation of metaphor” (1996: 117).
Repeatedly, Schmid-Gallistl emphasises the two-fold difficulty presented by 
the translation of metaphor, i.e. the decoding of the original expression and 
its subsequent re-encoding in the target language, which for the translator is 
often fraught with the danger of disregarding register and frequency of the 
respective metaphor if the image looks enticingly similar to the one used in 
the source language. Moreover, the author maintains that most translators 
are not sure which aspect of metaphor to recreate in the target text, its 
expression, image, or sense. She firmly believes that the translator requires a 
technique, a method, a theoretical framework, rather than mere intuition, 
should the translation of a metaphor be really successful, and that words and 
images do not matter in metaphor translation as long as the respective 
ontological and, especially, epistemic correspondences match in both 
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languages.39 She seems, however, and especially in the light of her claim 
that metaphor and culture have nothing to do with one another, unduly 
preoccupied with discovering a technique, a clear-cut method, for translating 
metaphors, especially if they prove  particularly stubborn (Schmid-Gallistl 
1996: 118).  
A literal translation of metaphors (unless you are lucky enough to have a pair 
of languages that share some ‘real’ equivalents, such as to throw in the towel
and das Handtuch werfen to imply that someone has given up on something) 
often provides hilarious results (and is often done deliberately by bilinguals 
among their own kind). One of such ‘Dinglish’ phrases in our family is, ‘If you 
think you can me over the ear beat then you are on the woodway!’ Apart from 
the obvious grammatical and lexical errors, this shows very nicely how 
metaphor or idiom is often untranslatable verbatim. A better English 
rendering of the above would probably be, ‘If you think you can cheat on me 
you can think again’ or some such. But again, this feels totally different to the 
German original ‘Wenn Du denkst, Du kannst mich übers Ohr hauen, bist Du 
auf dem Holzweg’.
2.4. Cultural transfer––negotiation accomplished?
All experience is cultural through and through
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003 [1980]: 57)
In her paper on the prospects of translation within a cultural framework, 
Fessenko (2003) defines culture as follows: 
Kultur, eigentlich die Summe der geistigen Errungenschaften einer 
Zeit oder eines Volkes, ist bezogen auf die Bereiche von Musik, 
Kunst, Literatur, Wissenschaft usw., die auch Moral, Glaube, Sitte, 
Brauch, Gewohnheiten und Verhaltensformen einschließt, welche 
der Mensch im Prozess der Sozialisation erwirbt. Kultur ist also 
nicht etwas, was von Natur aus gegeben ist, sondern vielmehr 
39 This reminds me of a sermon, held by a Swiss Methodist preacher, which I heard when I 
was about ten: he talked about den Kopf waschen (to tell someone off) and die Füße 
waschen (to serve one another)––the implications of which got totally lost in the inexpert 
interpreter’s verbatim rendering in English. 
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das, was durch das Leben in der sprachkulturellen Gemeinschaft 
erworben wird. (Fessenko 2003: 1)40
Therefore, culture is a kind of human potential that needs to be realised 
afresh by each group or generation, and it is a synthesis of unity and variety. 
Halliday (1990: 47) defines a “context of culture” as the broader institutional 
and ideological background against which a text must be interpreted, giving 
value to it but also constraining its interpretation. Culture is something that 
people do on certain occasions and the way they attach certain meanings 
and values to them. All these factors determine how a text is interpreted in its 
context of situation and make up the nonverbal environment of a text. 
In their chapter on the relationship between metaphor and cultural 
coherence, Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 23) claim that “the most fundamental 
values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the 
most fundamental concepts in the culture”. Many of these values in our 
particular culture, for instance, are coherent with spatialisation metaphors 
such as UP IS GOOD. The authors infer that our values are not independent 
but must form a coherent system with the metaphorical concepts governing 
our lives. Of course, values differ not only between two cultures but even 
within one and the same culture, and generally the subculture a person lives 
in determines which values are given priority, not to mention personal values. 
Individuals, like groups, assign different priorities to the values of the 
mainstream culture, but their individual value systems are still coherent with 
the main orientational metaphors of the latter (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 24). 
In general, though, the authors point out that, while not all cultures share our 
emphasis on the concept of up-down, “the major orientations seem to cut 
across all cultures, but which concepts are oriented which way and which 
orientations are most important vary from culture to culture” (ibid.).
Of course, it is not only the conceptual system that varies from one culture to 
another but also its linguistic expression. In the tradition of Whorf, Fessenko 
links language very firmly to thought (“die Sprache ist die Realität des 
40i.e. “ Culture, or rather the sum total of mental merits of a time or a people, refers to the 
areas of music, art, literature, science, etc., but also includes morals, faith, traditions, habits, 
and behavioural patterns man has acquired in the course of socialisation. Culture, therefore, 
is not given by nature,  but rather what we have acquired through living in a certain linguistic 
culture and society“
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Gedankens”41, 2003: 2) and between the conceptual and the linguistic levels, 
she defines a mental-lingual level, which serves to transcode “mental units” 
into verbal signs, functioning as a kind of “mental-lingual translator” which 
she refers to as the “Transform-Code”. Her approach is based on the concept 
of the “inner language” which was developed by the Russian literature expert 
Boris Eichenbaum and the Prague Linguistic Circle. This inner language 
negotiates between the text and the subject, between language and the 
psyche, and plays an essential role in all processes of human understanding 
and communication. Fessenko claims that this Transform-Code is universal 
in its structure, as no intra- or intercultural communication would otherwise be 
possible, and it serves as the basis of any cognitive human activity, which 
includes that of translating. Its realisation, however, can vary from one culture 
to another, which accounts for the ethno-cultural differences between the 
figurative language and conscious gestalts we use (2003: 3).  Other authors, 
such as Kloepfer, claim that metaphor poses no problem whatsoever for 
translation due to its universal “fields of imagery” (Kloepfer 1967: 116); 
however, I should still like to point out that culturally determined metaphors 
cannot be translated, or rather transferred, literally from one language to 
another. Of course, any creative use of metaphor in the target language may 
have to be tested for equivalence with the source language metaphor.
The culture factor plays a central part in the interpretation of metaphorical 
concepts. As many of our day-to-day activities are metaphorical in nature, the 
concepts used therefore structure our reality. Consequently, the introduction 
of a new metaphor into our culture and language creates a new reality, which 
has given rise to many a cultural change. New metaphors are created while 
old ones are lost––this view runs counter to conventional assumptions on the 
purely linguistic nature of metaphor. Of course, as Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 
145) point out here, words alone cannot create reality. However, changes of 
our conceptual system also affect our perception of the world around us and 
thus our reality. This is a view of reality that is entirely different to theories of 
objective, external reality which exists independent of human experience and 
perception. Still, it is the human aspect of reality that is central to our interest, 
41 ‘Language is the reality of thought’
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and this will vary from culture to culture, since different cultures are based 
upon different conceptual systems (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 146). Lakoff’s 
view is reminiscent of the revised Sapir-Whorf-Hypothesis (which suggests 
that each language may ‘create’ its own world and thus its own semantics42), 
as he says that each culture must come up with its own way of dealing with 
its environment, and that the social reality defined by a culture also 
influences its members’ view of physical reality. As we understand much of 
our social reality and part of our physical perception in metaphorical terms, 
metaphor plays a significant role in determining our reality. Aitchison 
emphasises the fact that certain metaphors are prominent in each decade, 
the most pervasive one currently being the computer, but also in each 
country or continent, the most popular American imagery in politics being 
sports (1994: 152). However, she also points out that the universal and the 
cultural aspects of metaphors are intertwined, and that “any language selects 
one portion of the universal picture and elaborates it” (Aitchison 1994: 153). 
For instance, fear triggers two opposing physical reactions, either English 
metaphors of cold (“rooted to the spot”, “icy-cold fingers of fear”, “frozen with 
fear”, etc.) or Greek metaphors of fleeing (“panic-stricken flight”), which 
shows that different cultures highlight different aspects of the world (1994: 
154). Aitchison goes on to say that specifically cultural metaphors interact 
with more general image-schemas, i.e. “outline frameworks from which we 
subconsciously work, such as the ‘ladder’ image” (ibid.) (an up-down scale, 
with “good” at the top and “bad” at the bottom, which seems to cut across 
most cultures we know, see above). Apart from the pervasive nature of 
metaphor, this illustrates to what extent our subconscious thought is 
structured by the ‘folk images’ we have been brought up with. Palmer, by 
contrast, seems to reject the idea of universals entirely, stating that “we do 
not find identity, but only close similarity” between the languages of two 
different cultures, especially in the case of colour terms and categories 
(1981: 115). 
Summing up, we have established that basic conceptual metaphors are part 
of a common conceptual system that is shared by the members of a culture. 
42 But: is this view their invention or did they, like Leo Weisgerber, borrow the idea from 
Wilhelm von Humboldt?
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‘Systematic’ means that there is a fixed correspondence between the domain 
that is to be understood and the structure of the domain we map onto it in 
order to understand it. This procedure is based on our common experience 
and resulting linguistic conventions, and largely unconscious. Still, the 
conceptual connections of our culture are indispensable to our understanding 
of a great number of words and idiomatic expressions in our language. 
Therefore, we need to regard translation always as a shift, not only between 
two languages but between two cultures, and the translator as a negotiator 
between the two: People with different conceptual systems understand the 
world in a way that is also different from our own in many ways, and this 
means that even their criteria for truth and reality may be vastly different. 
Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 184) maintain that “metaphors are basically 
devices for understanding and have little to do with objective reality, if there is 
such a thing”. They argue against so-called objectivism, saying that there is 
no fully objective, unconditional, or absolute truth, but also reject absolute 
subjectivism, quoting Humpty-Dumpty’s famous ditty that something means 
“just what I choose it to mean––neither more nor less” (see above).  Rather, 
they offer a “third choice to the myths of objectivism and subjectivism” (Lakoff 
and Johnson 2003: 185) in the shape of a new “experientialist myth”, which is 
a synthesis of imagination and reality. Therefore, metaphor is “imaginative 
rationality” (2003: 193) as it helps us to understand partially what cannot be 
comprehended in its totality, such as our emotions, aesthetic experiences, 
morality or spirituality. Truth, for them, is always relative to understanding 
and can never claim objectivity. Nevertheless, truth does exist, albeit only 
relative to our conceptual system, and subject to our daily experiences, 
interactions, and physical and cultural environments. Likewise, meaning can 
never be disembodied but must always be embedded into our understanding. 
This is especially significant in the case of metaphor as, while it is oftentimes 
literally false, its figurative, i.e., metaphorical meaning can be true. 
Does this mean that all metaphors are culture-specific? Or can they be 
transferred from one culture to another? Lakoff claims that some metaphors 
are universal, as experience entails so much more than just a specific 
cultural background, saying that “Inevitably, many primary metaphors are 
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universal because everybody has basically the same kinds of bodies and 
brains and lives in basically the same kinds of environments, so far as the 
features relevant to metaphor are concerned” (Lakoff and Johnson 2003:
257). For some, this could imply that metaphor can be translated across any 
two languages without loss of effect or meaning. Actually, Lakoff, and other 
authors, however, maintain that some metaphors at least are not 
translatable, especially those used for effect, such as in advertising. Lakoff 
and Johnson (2003: 227), especially, raise the issue that objectivity always 
depends on the respective cultural values, rendering reasonable objectivity 
and thus truth impossible in case of conflicting values or conceptual systems. 
For them, meaning is never cut and dried; rather, it depends on our 
imagination and the coherence of our metaphorically structured conceptual 
system. While primary metaphors may be universal, more complex 
metaphors that are composed of such primary ones and thus make use of 
culturally based concepts will differ significantly from culture to culture (Lakoff 
and Johnson 2003: 257). 
Eco’s interpretation also seems to make sense, though: In a short aside on 
the relation between translation and ontology, he claims that there are some 
universal phenomena that any language knows, such as physical 
experiences (e.g. walking, crawling, jumping, etc.) or weather conditions 
(rain, sunshine etc.) but no flying humans and the like, and this suggests that 
there exists a “hard core of being” (Eco 2003: 181) independent of the 
language or culture we grow up with. So, while Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 
231-232) claim that all our experience is cultural in a way, they do allow for 
the fact that some experiences (e.g. standing up) are more physical and less 
‘cultural’ than others (e.g. attending a wedding ceremony). In such cases, the 
translator is not faced with insurmountable difficulty, as s/he is in the case of 
more abstract concepts––a simple English phrase like ‘I love you’ is used in 
contexts in which a German speaker would never utter it. So, while 
philosophers and linguists may have sufficient leisure to discuss such 
discrepancies indefinitely, a translator is confronted with them on a daily 
basis, more often than not under extreme economic pressure, and therefore 
compelled to solve the puzzle one way or another (and fast). Usually, 
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translators have neither the time nor the inclination to apply complicated rules 
such as the ones used below for the translation of metaphors, so they are 
rather inclined to follow their intuition and instinct, as does every fluent 
bilingual. I would also advocate such a procedure; only in cases where no 
obvious solution to an immediate problem presents itself would I choose to 
follow a more systematic approach and analyse a text according to such 
rules (e.g. the ones proposed by Schmid–Gallistl 1996).
Another tricky phenomenon, as Eco (2003: 39) points out, and steeped in 
metaphor, is the translation of vulgar expressions and profanities, not to 
speak of the typical four-letter words, which are also often used 
metaphorically. What in German might be, if not quite acceptable, just plain 
vulgar, in English might be regarded as downright obscene, and vice versa, 
or what in Italian might be rude but not unusual, in German would be utterly 
blasphemous. In such cases, the translator is forced to incur inevitable 
cultural losses––and to translate ‘situations’. Another such example would be 
the so-called fixed forms, or speech formulas (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 51). 
They consist of a number of words but function like single ones, and they are 
legion in our language. Such phrasal lexical items are usually structured 
coherently by one metaphorical concept and culturally dependent, which 
means that the translator often has extreme difficulty transferring them to 
another language. Both the profanities and the fixed expressions Salman 
Rushdie uses in his works are oftentimes almost impossible to translate, and 
this is one of the reasons many passages of the German version of The 
Satanic Verses sound very wooden and pompous. 
Mary Snell-Hornby (1986: 16) has suggested an integrated approach to the 
translation of metaphor, claiming that the phenomenon of metaphor itself is 
supra-cultural, whereas the associative potential of symbols and images is 
often culture-specific. Moreover, the question of whether a metaphor can be 
translated, or how difficult it is to transfer from one language to another, 
cannot be decided by a given set of abstract rules but rather depends on the 
respective metaphor within the text concerned. It follows that a translator 
needs to be familiar not only with two languages and cultures, but also with 
two different conceptual systems. When people need to communicate without 
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sharing the same culture, knowledge, etc., mutual understanding becomes 
extremely difficult. Still, it is possible through the negotiation of meaning (cf. 
Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 231). For this purpose, a translator must be aware 
of the differences in cultural backgrounds and world views, plus have a talent 
for finding the right metaphor to get the original message across. 
So far, Snell-Hornby’s point of view is the one I favour before all the others I 
have come across in my research, even if she offers no method as such to 
the translator, as Schmid-Gallistl (1996) has called for. While, naturally, the 
role of the translator as a communicator across cultures is one of my main 
concerns, we must bear in mind that translators are not supposed to create 
language but rather to ‘re-create’ it according to already existing linguistic 
and cultural norms; and so far, my original ‘feeling’ has not been changed 
one iota: metaphors cannot be translated from one language to another 
without incurring some kind of loss. Something inevitably gets lost in the 
process (even if, as Rushdie prefers to think, something is also gained in 
translation), as I am planning to show further below in my case study.
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3. Section II––A case study: 
“The Satanic Verses” by Salman Rushdie
3.1. The life and work of Salman Rushdie43
Our identity is at once plural and partial.
Sometimes we feel that we straddle two cultures;
at other times, that we fall between two stools.44
Salman Ahmed Rushdie was born in Bombay on 19 June 1947, in the year of 
Indian independence, as the eldest son of a wealthy liberal family. His father, 
a Muslim businessman, was a connoisseur of literature who spoke Hindi and 
Urdu, and understood Persian and Arabic. In order to get a traditionally 
British education, his son, aged 14, went to Rugby Public School in 1961. A 
year later, his whole family followed for a short time, obtained the British 
Citizenship and then moved on to Karachi in Pakistan while Salman attended 
King’s College in Cambridge, where he read history. In 1968 he graduated 
with honours and travelled to Pakistan to be with his family, and to work as a 
journalist for print media and television. Soon, however, in 1969, Rushdie 
returned to London––the Pakistani way of censoring such work proved to be 
too much for him. Back in England, Salman Rushdie continued to work as a 
journalist, but additionally acted at the avant-garde Fringe Theatre. Between 
’69 and ’73 he also worked as an ad writer, which he continued to do part-
time until 1980.  
In 1970 he met Clarissa Luard and married her 6 years later, only to get 
divorced in 1987. Rushdie dedicated his children’s book Haroun and the Sea 
of Stories, published in 1990, to their son Zafar. 
Salman Rushdie began to write in 1973, starting with two novels that were to 
remain unpublished. Apart from his literary work, he also wrote book reviews 
and scripts for the two TV films The Riddle of Midnight and The Painter and 
43 The most detailed biography I found was the one compiled by Sandra Vlasta in her thesis 
(“Zwischen Mythos Indien und den Satanischen Versen––die Rezeption Salman Rushdies 
im deutschsprachigen Raum”, 2002), pages 11 to 13.
44 Rushdie, Salman, “Imaginary Homelands“, in: Imaginary Homelands, 1992, Penguin 
Books, p 15
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the Pest.  Finally, in 1975, his first novel Grimus was published, “which, to put 
it mildly, bombed”, as Salman Rushdie himself wrote about it in Imaginary 
Homelands (1992: 1). He began to get involved in immigrants’ matters and 
travelled to India in order to do some research for his next novel, Midnight’s 
Children, which was published in 1981 and won the Booker Prize, the James 
Tait Black Prize and the Prize awarded by the English Speaking Union the 
same year, and the Booker of Bookers two years later. 
Shame, published in 1983, put Rushdie back on the literary agenda, he was 
again nominated for the Booker Prize and won the French Prix du Meilleur 
Livre Étrangé. Rushdie also joined the Royal Society of Literature. 
A journey to Nicaragua, where Rushdie had the opportunity of talking to 
politicians, authors and farmers who lived and worked there, inspired him to 
the opus The Jaguar Smile: A Nicaraguan Journey (1987). In 1988 he 
married author Marianne Wiggins. Finally, on 26 September 1988, Viking / 
Penguin published Rushdie’s incendiary novel The Satanic Verses in Great 
Britain, and it was awarded the Whitbread Prize. Soon after this, violent 
protests ensued all over the world. The novel was forbidden in several 
countries, and Rushdie accused of blasphemy, a serious offence in Islamic 
regions. 
Together with Elizabeth West, Rushdie published The Vintage Book of Indian 
Writing in 1997, a collection of texts written by English-speaking Indian 
writers between 1947 and 1997. Two years later another of Rushdie’s 
monumental works appeared––The Ground Beneath Her Feet, highly 
acclaimed by the critics (and one of my personal favourites)––and in 
September 2001 Fury, which proved less popular with the critics. His latest 
book, Shalimar The Clown, published in 2005, once again hit the headlines 
and was apostrophised as one of Rushdie’s masterpieces. 
Until very recently, Salman Rushdie lived in New York with his third wife, 
model and TV hostess Padma Lakshmi, who, however, has just filed for 
divorce. Apparently, none of Rushdie’s partners managed to come to terms 
with the danger of being the cynosure of Islamic eyes, and a target for 
fanaticism, especially now that Rushdie has been knighted by Her Majesty, 
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Queen Elizabeth II. Time will tell whether he will ever manage to take up a 
“normal” life after all the difficulties he has been going through for the sake of 
a right most of us usually take for granted––that of the Freedom of Speech.
3.2. The Satanic Verses––A Bone of Contention
At the centre of the storm stands a novel, 
a work of fiction, one that aspires to the
condition of literature. It has often seemed to 
me that people on all sides of the argument 
have lost sight of this simple fact. The Satanic Verses
 has been described, and treated, as a work of
 bad history, as an anti-religious pamphlet, 
as the product of an international capitalist-Jewish 
conspiracy, as an act of murder (‘he has murdered 
our hearts’), as the product of a person
 comparable to Hitler and Attila the Hun. It felt
 impossible, amid such hubbub, to insist on the 
fictionality of fiction. 45
The title of the novel The Satanic Verses derives from certain verses that 
were originally integrated into the Q’uran, Islam’s holy book, and later 
discarded. They refer to three Islamic goddesses, Manat, Uzza, and Al-Lat. 
While Mohammad initially claimed that these three were Allah’s 
intermediaries, reminding us of Mary’s role in Roman Catholicism, later he 
was forced to remove them from the faith again, which he ultimately 
defended by asserting that the words he had used to introduce them were 
not inspired by God himself but by his vilest enemy, the Shaitan, Satan, the 
devil incarnate, who had masqueraded as the voice of the holy. Rushdie’s 
novel hinges upon this banning of the original satanic verses, highlighting the 
slightly unsavoury nature of this happening. 
A short synopsis of this novel will be followed by a description of its 
background and publication, including some details of the British situation, 
the Islamic reaction to the opus, and the issue of blasphemy versus freedom 
of speech from different cultural and religious perspectives. A short analysis 
45 Imaginary Homelands (Rushdie 1992: 393)
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of the The Satanic Verses from the literary point of view will round off this 
chapter. 
3.2.1 Synopsis
The Satanic Verses seems to be a phantasmagoric,
surrealistic, and absurdist book. It is huge, sprawling, 
opaque,  nihilistic, and kaleidoscopic. It is crammed with
 esoterica, allegories, parables, metaphors, Arab words, 
and word plays. It is inventive, exuberant, and incoherent, if
 not crazy. Little in the book is at it seems, for a devil in one
scene is an angel in the next, and heaven becomes hell.46
In this opulent allegory, Salman Rushdie emulates the birth of his faith––
which he himself lost as a younger man. This fourth opus of Rushdie’s taxes 
the reader to the utmost with its wealth of figures, events, themes, motifs, 
allusions, and plots; however, when looking at it more closely and logically, a 
very clear, almost mathematical structure evolves, which shows how clearly 
demarcated the single strands of this story are. 
The protagonists of this novel are Gibreel Farishta, an actor well-known in 
India for his ‘Theologicals’, i.e., popular movies about Hindu myths, and 
Saladin Chamcha, an anglophile voice imitator working in TV commercials, 
who seems to have completely assimilated British culture. In the main plot, 
the two are on a flight from Bombay to London; Gibreel is trying to win back 
Himalaya-mountaineer Alleluia Cone, Saladin his wife Pamela, both rather 
glacial and very English beauties. However, the plane is hijacked by fanatics 
and blown up right above the channel on the English side (a fact which only 
evolves very gradually nearing the culmination and end of the novel). 
Miraculously, Gibreel and Saladin survive, but both metamorphose into 
something else during their fantastic fall through the clouds: Gibreel develops 
a halo while Saladin gradually grows a pair of horns. While the former 
manages all right in the beginning, finds his Allie and lives like a millionaire in 
a penthouse, even acquiring divine or rather archangelic characteristics, the 
latter is accused of being an illegal immigrant and taken into custody, where 
he is abused and treated like the animal he is changing into. After a long 
46 Levy 1995: 559
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period of hunger and strife, he finally manages to flee and find shelter with 
some Bangladeshi friends who run the Café Shandaar in London. After a lot 
of heartache and difficulty, doubts and terror he finally wins back his human 
shape during an immigrant rebellion. Full of rage at being left in the lurch by 
his former companion Gibreel he decides to take his revenge: In a series of 
anonymous telephone calls he pretends to be several of Allie’s lovers, which 
is easy for him, the “Man of the Thousand Voices”, and the relationship 
between Gibreel and Allie breaks up. Gibreel suspects Saladin of being 
instrumental in their split but still saves his life during ethnic riots and drags 
him from the burning Café Shandaar, where Saladin still lives. Thus, Gibreel 
seems to have atoned for many of his former sins. 
In the end both return to Bombay; Saladin to be with his dying father and 
Gibreel to make films about his visions, which are told in sub-plots throughout 
the novel. However, these movies turn out to be embarrassing flops, and 
when he is accused of murdering his producer, stuttering Whisky Sisodia, 
and Alleluia Cone, his mountaineering ex-lover, one Gibreel blows his brains 
out. Saladin, though, the loser throughout the entire story, is given a second 
chance with his lover, physician Zeeny Vakil.
The main plot, which is told in chapters I, III, V, and VII, is fairly 
straightforward––the subplots, related in chapters II, IV, VI, and VIII, are not. 
Gibreel’s dreams and visions begin with the early days of Islam in the 7th
century (and contain the critical passages), where he takes on the guise of 
the archangel Gabriel who passes on the divine revelations to Mahound (aka 
Mohammed, which especially enraged the faithful followers of Mohammad as 
the name Mahound was coined by medieval Christians to refer to the “devil” 
or a “false prophet”) but does not know whence they came. However, he also 
utters the so-called satanic verses, through which three female divinities are 
at first admitted into the Q’uran and then abandoned again. He has to fight 
against the devil and even wrestle the prophets and other angels at some 
stage, scenes with profound homoerotic allusions. He doubts, and this is the 
gravest offence:
Doubt, it seems to me, is the central condition of a human being in 
the 20th century. One of the things that has happened to us in the 
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20th century as a human race is to learn how certainty crumbles in 
your hand.47
Gibreel is depicted with a halo and divine qualities but feels and thinks like a 
rather weak man, human and utterly fallible. His dreams begin when, 
recovering from a serious disease, he loses his faith as Allah failed to answer 
his prayers during his tribulations, and he feasts on a mountain of pork. One 
vision flows into another, forming a coherent sequence.  
A second subplot tells the story of Mahound in Jahilia, symbol of the Holy 
City of Mecca, of his exile, return and fight against the resistance of Baal, the 
dissenting poet, who has persuaded the whores in his bordello Hijab 
(=curtain, or women’s veil) to assume the names of the prophet’s twelve 
wives in order to promote business (another nail in Rushdie’s religious 
coffin…)––which goes to show that once religion is deployed for secular profit 
things start to go seriously wrong. Finally Mahound manages to have Baal 
arrested and sentenced to death for his blasphemous action.
Rushdie has also sneaked his own persona between the covers of his book 
and thus more or less predicted his own fall from grace: Salman the scribe, a 
historical figure, is called upon to write down Mahound’s prophecies just as 
he got them from Gibreel––but the scribe decides to test the Prophet by 
changing the verses, at first subtly and then so much that the prophet begins 
to realise what exactly he is doing (unthinkable––the holy Q’uran altered by a 
simple scribe!). Salman is accused of unforgivable blasphemy and 
ostracised: “Your blasphemy, Salman, can’t be forgiven. Did you think I 
wouldn’t work it out? To set your words against the words of God?” (TSV48 p
374) 
Another strand of the plot weaves the story of Ayesha, a girl full of faith and 
surrounded by shimmering butterflies, who calls her entire village to join her 
in her foot-pilgrimage to Mecca––only to lead them to their watery deaths in 
the waters of the Arabian Sea. 
47 Interview with Salman Rushdie, 27 January 1989, by Bandung File. Quoted in Sanga 
2001: 20.
48 I shall henceforth refer to The Satanic Verses this way.
63
3.2.2 Background and reactions
Central to the purposes of The Satanic 
Verses is the process of reclaiming
language from one’s opponents.
 (Imaginary Homelands 1992: 402)
The Satanic Verses was first published in the United Kingdom by Viking 
Press / Penguin in September 1988, only to be banned in India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Egypt, Somalia, Saudi-Arabia, Qatar, 
Indonesia, and South Africa, all countries with Muslim majorities, within the 
following two months. Especially in the author’s home country as well as in 
Pakistan the revolts were particularly violent, 22 demonstrators were killed, 
and hundreds injured. Shortly after this, Muslims in England were also 
starting to protest against the publication of this controversial novel––
especially in the mostly Muslim town Bradford, where the book was publicly 
burned––to be followed by mass protests all around the world. Rushdie 
received several bomb threats so he was forced to cancel many of his 
readings, and although he publicly apologised for hurting Islamic feelings, 
storms on embassies in the Middle East, as well as riots in Kashmir, 
Bombay, and Dacca ensued, and ultimately a fatwa49 was imposed on the 
author. The fatwa was issued by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (who is also 
portrayed in the opus as an exiled imam), at the time Iran’s revered leader of 
about fifty million Shiites, on 14 February 1989, and a high reward promised 
to the one who managed to kill Salman Rushdie. Iran even despatched a 
death squad, and the issue erupted into a world-wide controversy. Rushdie 
was forced to go into hiding in order to save his life, and security forces and 
shelter were provided for him by Western countries, especially by his new 
home country Great Britain. However, the fatwa was extended to other 
persons as well: Anyone who dared criticise it also became its target, 
49 A fatwa is a religious decree against something which is deemed dangerous or threatening 
to either the Islamic faith or its laws, authorising any Muslim to enact the sentence, even 
capital punishment, on the perpetrator of the crime.
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including bookstores displaying the novel (such as W H Smith) or dissenting 
imams, and publishers and translators were threatened with death. 
Consequently, England ceased all diplomatic communications with Iran, and 
both countries withdrew their ambassadors, only to reinstate them in 
September 1990. Despite the danger to his life and that of his family, 
Rushdie was unable to keep a low profile; reacting to the fatwa he published 
his essay Is Nothing Sacred, which was later included in Imaginary 
Homelands (1992). In this essay he expounded the fact that people fought 
wars more over language than over territory (p 420), and reconfirmed his 
belief in personal freedom, and in the freedom of speech:
Facing the utter intransigence, the philistine scorn of so much of 
Actually Existing Islam, I reluctantly concluded that there was no 
way for me to help bring into being the Muslim culture I’d dreamed 
of, the progressive, irreverent, sceptical, argumentative, playful 
and unafraid culture which is what I’ve always understood as 
freedom. Not me, not in this lifetime, no chance. Actually Existing 
Islam, which has all but deified its Prophet, a man who always 
fought passionately against such deification; which has supplanted 
a priest-free religion by a priest-ridden one; which makes literalism 
a weapon and redescriptions a crime, will never let the likes of me 
in. (1992: 437)
Although he repeatedly stressed that he greatly regretted hurting the 
sensibilities of millions of Muslims all over the world he never expressed any 
contrition about actually writing The Satanic Verses––which would have been 
the only way of calling off the death squads and ending the fatwa. The 
isolation seemed to prove too much for Rushdie’s wife Marianne, as she left 
him in August 1989.
In December 1990 Rushdie again tried to find a way of lifting the fatwa by 
signing a declaration of his affinity with Islam and its followers, maintaining 
that the characters in his book are not representative of his own views, but he 
only met with rejection. The Iranian regime refused to call off any of the 
imposed ostracisms, most probably for political, domestic reasons. Later 
Rushdie renounced his testimony to Islam, calling it a white lie in times of 
trouble, and despite the great danger––in July 1991 Japanese Professor 
Hitoshi Igarashi was murdered, one week after the Italian Ettore Capriole was 
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stabbed and badly injured, because both of them had translated The Satanic 
Verses into their respective languages––the novel was translated into 
French, Italian and Norwegian, even though the respective translators used 
pseudonyms in order to protect their identities. The German publishers 
Kiepenheuer & Witsch postponed the German translation indefinitely for 
security reasons, so several crusading publishers, authors and literary 
organisations founded the Artikel 19 Verlag, which was based on Article 19 of 
the Human Rights Charta, i.e. the freedom of speech, and finally published 
the Satanic Verses in 1990, after the 1989 book fair of Frankfurt, where the 
Norwegian50 version of the book was the only translation available, and no 
Iranian stand was to be seen. Many other publishers and printing houses 
from Germany, Austria and Switzerland joined the consortium, and the 
proceeds from the book sale went to the organisation ‘Writers in Prison’.
In spite of the danger to his life Salman Rushdie has been trying slowly to 
inch back into a more normal sort of life; he travels, publicly promotes his 
books, and gives numerous interviews. In 1999 the Iranian government 
officially renounced the fatwa, but Muslim fundamentalists still cling to it and 
have even increased the sum put on Rushdie’s demise. Meanwhile the 
author has left Great Britain and currently lives in New York.
While The Satanic Verses has been translated into numerous languages to 
date, despite the initial difficulties described above, and sold more then 1.5 
million copies world-wide, it is still banned in the majority of Muslim countries. 
Ironically, most of the so-called intellectuals who advocated the ban have 
admitted to not even having read it (e.g. Sher Azam of the Bradford Council 
of Mosques, who publicly admitted that “Books are not my thing”51)––albeit 
with the claim that it is too scandalous a text for them even to contemplate 
doing so. Levy (1995: 562) suspects that much of the hysteria in Britain was 
deliberately incited by extremists in order to exploit already prevalent anti-
Western feelings. The fact that the novel received high acclaim in the 
Western world, even being short-listed for the prestigious Booker Prize in 
50 Four years later, the CEO of the publishing house Aschehoug, William Nygaard, was shot 
in front of his house in Oslo and badly injured.
51 Imaginary Homelands 1992: 403
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1989 and awarded the Whitbread Literary Prize worth twenty thousand 
pounds the same year (although the nomination was withdrawn at first for 
political reasons), further enraged the Muslim fundamentalists who so 
violently opposed the publication of this opus. Some Islamic mullahs even 
suspected the West of plotting an attack on Islam through the Rushdie affair, 
in order to denigrate their faith and insult its followers, as Rushdie seems to 
represent Islam as a religion invented by Mohammad and not revealed by 
Allah himself. Indeed, Islam fundamentalism regards the Western world as 
‘unbelievers’ who hold nothing sacred, and therefore fail to understand the 
concept of blasphemy. Amid the razzmatazz about the effrontery towards 
Muslim sensibilities, few have however taken note of the fact that the novel is 
equally disrespectful of British authorities and celebrities: Mrs Thatcher is 
renamed “Mrs Torture” and her wax effigy ritually burned in the course of 
ethnic riots in London (maybe that was why the Iron Lady hesitated to grant 
Rushdie full diplomatic protection straight away). Rushdie also highlights the 
British arrogance towards other ethnicities in this opus, as he has done in 
other works before this one. Multicultural societies are replacing “pure” ones 
(if such a thing ever existed) and hybridity has become the only possible 
societal form of today’s world:
Those who oppose the novel most vociferously today are of the 
opinion that intermingling with a different culture will inevitably 
weaken and ruin their own. I am of the opposite opinion. The 
Satanic Verses celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the 
transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of 
human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices 
in mongrelization and fears the absolutism of the Pure. Melange, 
hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that is how newness enters the 
world. 52
Mutation and recreation are motifs throughout most of Rushdie’s works, and 
this he seems to regard as the main target of world literature: eclecticism, 
fusion, and bastardisation, just as he argues that plurality and hybridity 
represent the backbone of ‘his’ India.  
Rushdie is, perhaps, the most famous author on whom the fatwa has been 
imposed, but far from the only one. All over the world writers are suffering for 
52 Rushdie, Salman, Imaginary Homelands, Penguin, London, 1992, p 393/394
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expressing their opinions freely, have become victims of murder, 
imprisonment or persecution, and are forced to live in hiding or constant 
flight. Many have written letters of solidarity to Rushdie, published in For 
Rushdie and The Rushdie Letters, although the international public is 
generally unaware of the violence such authors often have to face for 
exercising their right to freedom of thought and its expression. Today, 
Rushdie seems to be relatively free from the constraints of the fatwa and 
finally able to live like any other “normal” celebrity. He even ventured into the 
country of his birth with his twenty-year-old son Zafar in April 1999 after more 
than twelve years of exile, which, in his own words, was his “dream of 
glorious return”. And glorious it was! He was welcomed enthusiastically by 
many Indians, despite several violent Muslim protests preceding his travels, 
and received acclaim for his work at the Commonwealth Writers Award 
ceremony. 
3.2.3 Literary reviews
There are times when I feel that the
 original intentions of The Satanic Verses
have been so thoroughly scrambled
 by events as to be lost for ever.53
If I had to interpret this novel in a literary way I would liken it to a Persian rug: 
beautiful to behold due to its millions of knots and colours, skeins of wool and 
silk of varying colours, textures, and strength are joined in unexpected 
places, all these strands are skilfully interwoven and at some points difficult 
to disentangle but somehow, miraculously, they form an intelligent entity and 
unravel. They join only to separate again, the pattern seems haphazard at 
close quarters and rather wild, like a crazy quilt but with a mission that 
emerges only if you stand back and regard it from a safe distance. The 
reader comes to realise that any coherence can only be established at a 
metaphorical level––and metaphors are the only cohesive device that really 
hold the entire opus together. Obviously it can be evaluated against a 
53 Rushdie, Salman, Imaginary Homelands, Penguin, London, 1992, p 403
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background of history or religion, each of which has a separate metaphorical 
system, and a slowly evolving logic––so none of it should be taken lightly, or 
at face value, as Rushdie himself emphasises:
I do not believe that novels are trivial matters. The ones I care 
most about are those which attempt radical reformulations of 
language, form and ideas, those that attempt to do what the word 
novel seems to insist upon: to see the world anew. I am well 
aware that this can be a hackle-raising, infuriating attempt.54
Amid the world-wide outcry against or for the publication of this controversial 
novel, its literary analysis seems to have been strangely unimportant for 
many. However, a few reviewers actually did their work even if their opinions 
of this novel differed widely55. 
American and English reviewers strongly disagreed about the quality of the 
book; while it was short-listed for the Booker Prize and many eulogised about 
it, calling it a veritable ‘masterpiece’, others referred to it as unreadable or at 
least very difficult to read. Some regarded it as entirely superfluous, others as 
a wonderful story full of parables, dreams and allegories from the Q’uran, a 
story about good and evil. A debate ensued as to the exact literary genre of 
this novel––is it surrealist, magical realism, or something else entirely? 
Rushdie (1992) defended his choice of form thus:
My work […] has made it essential for me to confront the issue of 
religious faith. Even the form of my writing was affected. If one is 
to attempt honestly to describe reality as it is experienced by 
religious people, for whom God is no symbol but an everyday fact, 
then the conventions of what is called realism are quite 
inadequate. The rationalism of that form comes to seem like a 
judgement upon, an invalidation of, the religious faith of the 
characters being described. A form must be created which allows 
the miraculous and the mundane to co-exist on the same level––
as the same order of event. I found this to be essential even
though I am not, myself, a religious man. (“In God We Trust”, 
Imaginary Homelands 1992: 376)
54 Rushdie, Salman, Imaginary Homelands, Penguin, London, 1992, p 393
55 In her master’s thesis “Zwischen Mythos Indien und den Satanischen Versen” (2002), 
Sandra Vlasta provides a very good summary of the press reactions especially in the 
German and Anglo-American worlds. 
69
The Satanic Verses has been compared to James Joyce’s Ulysses––the 
reader is said to be equally confused after reading it––and Laurence Sterne’s 
Tristram Shandy, which is equally difficult to retell. Others have likened 
Rushdie’s style to that of Günter Grass, who actually is a very good friend 
and staunch supporter of Salman Rushdie’s. Grass’ opus Unkenrufe even 
incorporates a character mindful of Rushdie himself, in the shape of a highly 
successful, shrewd businessman operating in eastern Germany, a man of 
Indian origin. Some reviewers closely inspect the title, which refers to the 
passages originally added to the Q’uran by Muhammad to include three pre-
Islamic deities into the faith. Later these verses are taken out of the Holy 
Book again as they had been “whispered into the Prophet’s ear by the devil” 
himself. 
Others have written about the numerous literary allusions contained in the 
book––from Il Principe via Othello to Der Steppenwolf and Finnegan’s Wake–
–and liken Rushdie to authors such as García Márquez, Pynchon, Calvino, 
Gore Vidal or Pirandello (cf. Vlasta 2002: 74). Christian Seiler, writing for the 
Weltwoche, accuses Rushdie of borrowing from a wild miscellany of sources, 
“from Jorge Luis Borges and Woody Allen, […] Klaus Maria Brandauer, the 
Doors, Walt Disney, Henry James, W H Hudson, Bob Dylan, and 
Shakespeare” (cf. Vlasta 2002: 75). Many talk of Rushdie’s puns and funny 
wordplays, from Attallah over Alleluia Cone to Whisky Sisodia, the stuttering 
producer, while some criticise the wealth of disparate voices and abundant 
narratives, and the fact that you could open the novel on any page and start 
reading (ibid.). The Zeit critic attacks Rushdie’s self-appointed role as 
auctorial narrator who is way above and beyond the meanderings of his 
story. Rushdie is holding the strings in his hands and letting his puppets 
dance to his tune, and many of his moves stay inscrutable to his readers, 
such as the function of pilgrim Ayesha (cf. Vlasta 2002: 77) I beg to differ 
from this point of view––the prophetess Ayesha, originally Mohammad’s 
favourite wife, fulfils the role of female religious leader, a kind of female 
Moses, which is a species that is very scarce in the Islamic faith and society 
and as such essential for Rushdie’s view of women, who strongly disagrees 
with Islam’s treatment of them and seems to put forward a feminist revision of 
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this religion (cf. Sanga 2001: 115). This he describes in more detail in his 
novel Shame:
I had thought, before I began, that what I had on my hands was an 
almost exclusively masculine tale, a saga of sexual rivalry, 
ambition, power, patronage, betrayal, death, revenge. But the 
women seem to have taken over; they marched in from the 
peripheries of the story to demand the inclusion of their own 
tragedies, histories and comedies, obliging me to couch my 
narrative in all manner of sinuous complexities, to see my ‘male’ 
plot refracted, so to speak, through the prisms of its reverse and 
‘female’ side. It occurs to me that the women knew precisely what 
they were up to––that their stories explain, and even subsume, the 
men’s. Repression is a seamless garment. […] If you hold down 
one thing you hold down the adjoining. In the end, though, it all 
blows up in your face.56
In his essay “One Thousand Days in a Balloon” (Imaginary Homelands 1992:
437), Rushdie deplores the fact that “actually Existing Islam has failed to 
create a free society anywhere on Earth, and it wasn’t about to let me, of all 
people, argue in favour of one. Suddenly I was (metaphorically) among 
people whose social attitudes I’d fought all my life––for example, their 
attitude about women […]”.
Purportedly, the original Ayesha led a violent military campaign against the 
Prophet’s son-in-law, which for male Muslims was reason enough to subdue 
women and keep them out of public and political life. 
3.3. Main types of metaphor used by Rushdie
In one sense words are our masters, 
or communication would be impossible.
In another we are the masters; 
otherwise there could be no poetry.57
3.3.1. In the beginning was the word
It seems to be no accident that many of the world’s religious scriptures assert 
that the universe was created by a word. Additionally, word magic was the 
56 Shame p 173
57 Roger W. Holmes, “The Philosopher’s Alice in Wonderland”, Antioch Review, Summer 
1959, in: The Annotated Alice, [1960] 2000: 227)
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original magic, for the naming of things and processes is the first step in 
gaining power over them. Even if the science of words is relatively young, the 
magic of words seems to have existed as long as humankind. As language 
has evolved in thousands of linguistic communities throughout the world, 
many different cultures have developed special expressions to describe and 
enhance the power of words (cf. Rheingold 2000: 46). In a sense, we are all 
magicians––the more we know about words, and how to use them, the more 
power we have over ourselves and our fellow ‘word magicians’, and the more 
options our lives offer us. In a higher sense, though, there are word 
magicians who are far superior to their fellows––and Salman Rushdie is such 
a one. His word power creates a wealth of new images and realities in his 
reader’s mind, and metaphor is one of the most powerful tools at this 
particular poet’s disposal.
From the experimentalist point of view as put forth by Lakoff and Johnson 
(2003: 235), metaphor is a matter of imaginative rationality, and therefore 
novel metaphors create new understandings and, thus, realities. This 
especially applies to poetic metaphor, where new conceptual metaphors are 
created using the medium of language. Rushdie is a perfect example of a 
creator of new metaphors. Not only does he coin new phrases, combining 
both high-brow and colloquial British English with Urdu and Bombay 
vernacular, he also evokes completely new images through the powerful use 
of new gestalts, thus creating new realities in his work. Especially, though, he 
shows his superior linguistic ability in the “marshalling of already existing 
forms of metaphoric thought to form new extensions and combinations of old 
metaphorical mappings” (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 267). A past master of
his craft, he uses conventional conceptual metaphors as the bases of many 
an allegory. His main argument for using this particular literary form (about 
the exact nature of which the literary world disagreed fundamentally, calling it 
anything from magical realism to surrealism) has been stated above. 
The conceptual system that structures cultures and religions is basically 
metaphorical in nature, while symbolic metonymies serve as crucial links 
between our everyday experience and the coherent metaphorical systems 
underlying religions and cultures. Thus, and due to the fact that they are 
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grounded in our physical experience, such metonymies provide an essential 
tool for understanding religious and cultural concepts (Lakoff and Johnson 
2003: 40).
According to Crystal (1995: 403), religious language has always been a 
“fruitful source of rule-breaking”, and “those who believe in God are 
continually trying to say what cannot be said”. As they attempt to describe 
through language something that is beyond words, they need to bend it, thus 
creating a special language of religion that is full of metaphor (in fact, no way 
could we talk about faith without this tool). Metaphors and paradoxes can be 
found throughout the tradition of Christianity. Crystal (ibid.) quotes John 
Donne, who concluded his “Divine Meditations” (XIV) with a series of striking 
paradoxes:
Take mee to you, imprison mee, for I,
Except you’ enthral mee, never shall be free,
Nor ever chast, except you ravish mee.
Some words or phrases would seem meaningless in everyday life but acquire 
a new meaning through their religious context. Crystal (ibid.) makes an 
interesting remark about the fact that “figurative language does not stay fresh 
forever, and the metaphors of traditional religious expression need to be 
regularly refurbished, if its message is to stay relevant, meaningful and alive”, 
and states that the devising of new ways of talking about God and His 
creation usually gives rise to controversy. Rushdie, who has coined many a 
new religious phrase and conjured up new images of God and His angels, is 
a prime example of this process. Obviously, conservative forces object to any 
changes and therefore strive to stem this flowing tide of newness, but it 
cannot really be stopped; spiritual renewal from the bottom rarely can. This 
new language is found chiefly in new collocations, i.e. new juxtapositions of 
lexical items which suggest ways of talking, and thus of thinking, about God 
that relate more meaningfully to present-day life. Crystal (1995: 403) sees the
reason for these processes in either fresh intellectual reflection or poetic 
inspiration, or else in a combination of the two––and Salman Rushdie seems 
to incorporate both in his work, and especially so in The Satanic Verses. 
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3.3.2 Migration
As already hinted at above, migration is a form of hybridity that is 
inescapable, inevitable in today’s multicultural societies, and for Rushdie the 
migrant seems to have become an aesthetic figure. Migration is a 
displacement or disruption that affects both a person’s language and, thus, 
identity. Sanga (2001: 117) highlights the hyphen––as in Indo-British, Anglo-
Irish etc.––and its role in complicating the migrant’s identity, but also its 
power to create an interstitial space, a space-between, which is uniquely the 
migrant’s and constitutes something entirely new and unspoiled. The idea of 
nation is abandoned in favour of new alternatives, thus opening a generative 
capacity which takes us beyond mere national boundaries, beyond the idea 
of home and belonging, even beyond the idea of family. 
Both Gibreel and Saladin have left their families in order to find a new identity 
abroad, and the latter even tries to metamorphose into a ‘good and proper 
Englishman’ by marrying a white British woman from a ‘posh’ family; instead, 
this act of self-denial turns him into a goatish demon. Neither of them finds 
what he is looking for but instead they both receive something they do not 
want. In this, they seem to share the fate of any immigrant faced with the 
same sort of choices that are not choices at all. In neither country do they 
have a real home––England regards them as inferior, as usurpers, while in 
India they have become the other, members of a different society. For them, 
the border seems to have become “the only reliable consistent home” as, just 
like their spiritual father, the author, they “can never settle fully on either side” 
(Sanga 2001: 17). Rushdie tries to expand this border and to call for a new 
conceptualisation of history from a postcolonial perspective. Though the 
migrant is often marginalised, his position has a lot to be said for––ideally, 
the migrant is “free of the shackles of nationalism” (Rushdie 1992: 124) and 
therefore free to forge new, imaginative relationships with people, ideas and 
memories instead of places. As the two protagonists topple from the sky, 
they metamorphose into two opposites––Gibreel turns into an archangel 
while Saladin changes into Satan––and throughout the tale they seem to 
operate as a dialectic combination, sometimes even blurring the boundaries 
between their self and the respective other: “Gibreelsaladin 
74
Farishtachamcha”––an instance of interchangeable or alternative identities. 
Even Mahound, as Rushdie has renamed Mohammad the prophet, fails to 
distinguish between the two, so closely are they related to one another. East 
and West intermingle, good and evil become indistinguishable. 
Such a duality of possibilities also exists within one and the same person, 
however, which is exemplified in the figures of both Gibreel and Chamcha 
themselves; the voice-over artist has so many voices that he seems to have 
lost his very own, original one, while the actor impersonates deities and loses 
his own identity to become an archangel. This idea of multiple selves seems 
central to the entire plot of this novel. Especially Chamcha strives to fit into 
the new community, to assimilate and establish himself as a true 
Englishman, and thus almost loses his Indian self. He cannot feel at home in 
either country: England rejects him and India has abandoned him; he cannot 
stay, but neither can he return. The severity of this conflict can only turn the 
immigrant into a demon, a monster, and Chamcha is further alienated and 
marginalised. 
3.3.3 Hybridity
Rushdie calls the process of hybridisation “the novel’s most crucial dynamic 
means” and stresses that “its ideas derive from many sources other than the 
Islamic ones” (1992: 403). Indeed, Indian culture has thrived on the 
multiplicity of religions and classes, of different languages and peoples, 
resulting in a highly pluralistic, and hybrid, microcosm. Hybridity can be 
defined as the process of fusing together different genders, nationalities, 
religions, ethnicities and classes, all of which make up modern-day society. 
Therefore, we can regard hybridity as a kind of result of migration and 
translation, a result that does away with any notion of unity and purity and 
thus challenges our view of the world. In Rushdie’s work, this process is 
mirrored in several ways, through his choice of genre––a wild mixture of 
different literary genres ranging from oral Indian narratives to the Western 
novel and from surrealism to realism––and his numerous intertwined stories, 
which first strike us as so many red herrings thrown in the way of our 
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understanding before they gradually emerge as subplots that actually have a 
bearing upon the case, even if their contexts remain contradictory to the main 
plot. It is, as Rushdie himself has put it, “a little of this and a little of that…”, 
an impure form that invokes newness as an integral metaphor of all his 
works, and especially so in The Satanic Verses. The plot of The Satanic 
Verses oscillates between two countries, India and England, and both 
cultures are fused, especially in the figure of Saladin. Although Chamcha 
tries to reject his own background he acquires a hybrid identity, neither fully 
English nor fully Indian but rather incorporating both, and finally succeeds, 
while Gibreel, his alter ego, fails to embrace such hybridity and falters in the 
end. 
By deploying this hybridity, Rushdie seems to resist not only the 
predominance of English culture but also the intolerance of most ideologies 
inherent in his own culture. A new image of the world emerges from this 
overlapping of Eastern and Western discourses, subversive and full of 
strength. This is also exemplified in the great variety of different registers and 
genres (including that of the film, both Eastern and Western, of comics, 
documentaries and popular TV series) scattered throughout the entire work. 
Sanga (2001: 20) has also noted on the deployment of film terminology and 
cinematic techniques such as montage, collage, fade-in and fade-out, cuts, 
close-ups and wide angle shots. 
History is fallible and every person is a migrant in time, as the past can never 
be recreated. This notion of fragmentation is central to Rushdie’s fiction and 
emphasises the essentially personal process of piecing together the 
inconsistencies in order to establish our (sometimes dual) identity. By 
including absurdity and magic into this process, Rushdie shows that no 
historical account can render an accurate tale of what is true. However, the 
narrative relies upon the authority of reality, despite its fusion with the unreal; 
in his novel Midnight’s Children, Rushdie says that “reality can have 
metaphorical content, that does not make it less real” (1995: 282).
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3.3.4 Translation
Translation here must be regarded as more than just a linguistic process. For 
Rushdie, it also means transgression and transformation, of people, 
situations and circumstances. This he highlights by transforming English into 
something new, mingling Shakespearean phrase with Urdu expressions and 
Bombay vernacular, which often puts the ‘plain’ English reader at a 
disadvantage. Indeed, Rushdie’s prose seems to privilege the Indian reader, 
even though he writes in the oppressor’s language, that is, English. There is 
a constant condensing and displacement of meanings, which sometimes 
renders a clear-cut reading of the novel difficult (if not downright impossible, 
as some have claimed). In this sense, translation seems to be connected to 
metaphor as it also involves transformation and change. In The Satanic 
Verses, Rushdie seems to re-invent English by adding to it, by Indianising it, 
so to speak, by “chutnifying the Queen’s English”, as some have put it (cf. 
Sanga 2001: 64) and thus shaking off the shackles of colonialism. In a way, 
English had also become the language of the former British colonies, and 
therefore an integral part of the latter’s culture––a hybrid culture, if you like, 
based on a complex process of translation and transformation. Rushdie 
seems to resist the hegemony of the English language by nativising and 
personalising it according to his own rules; places and characters are made 
to represent people, the language itself parallels post-colonialism, and what 
is real becomes fictional, and vice versa. Being ‘borne across’, translated and 
metaphorised, obviously opens up new vistas for the migrant between 
cultures; rather than having to give up his original roots, he has a surfeit of 
rules, and he is faced with a variety of choices. A decision needs to be made. 
Translation is the creation of something new, a dialectic birth of hitherto 
unknown concepts and freedoms, and as such utterly desirable. Thus, it ties 
in with the above-mentioned process of reclamation as for instance when 
Saladin Chamcha is transformed into a “goatish, horned and hoofy demon” 
and he and other migrants are “demonised by their ‘host culture’s’ attitude to 
them”: “They have the power of description, and we succumb to the pictures 
they construct” (Rushdie 1992: 402). So, just as migrants do not become 
devils merely because others call them thus, the book title does not mean 
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that the entire Q’uran was written or inspired by the devil incarnate. However, 
metaphors are instruments of power, as we would do well to remember, 
admonishes Sanga, focussing especially on the colonial metaphors of British 
imperialism and the way such metaphors were disseminated synonymously 
throughout all the former British colonies (cf. Sanga 2001: 2). According to 
her, this “practice of homogenising diverse cultures by representing  them 
through the same system of metaphors was in a effect a way in which the 
British Empire could deal with alterity and difference” (ibid.). Postcolonial 
literature, by contrast, attempts to reshape these firmly entrenched 
metaphors of British colonialism, thus creating something entirely new. In 
Rushdie’s novels, this is done through absorbing real historical events and 
elaborating them in a fictional way. Such eclecticism is intended to “unmask 
the colonial intonations and begin to change the metaphors we live by” 
(Sanga 2001: 4). 
Schneider (1999) has established a connection between Freud’s work Das 
Unheimliche and our conception of such monsters, albeit cinematic ones, 
calling them a “reconfirmation in reality of previously surmounted beliefs”58
Therefore, “horror promotes emotional catharsis in audiences; like fantasy, it 
offers viewers an escape from the tedium of everyday life; like comedy, it 
provides a relatively safe (because relatively disguised/distorted) forum for 
the expression of socio-cultural fears”. For Schneider, monsters are the 
“metaphorical embodiments of paradigmatic uncanny narratives”, whose role 
it is to “reconfirm previously surmounted beliefs by their very presence” 
(ibid.). 
Saladin Chamcha is turned into a two-horned beast, with devil’s hooves and 
gigantic genitals, again focussing the reader’s attention on the satanic theme 
pervading the entire novel. 
58 http://www.othervoices.org/1.3/sschneider/monsters.html
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3.3.5 Religious metaphor and blasphemy 
Pleasechu meechu . . . hopeyu guessma nayym
(Sympathy for the Devil59)
Perhaps it is possible to uncover an “interstitial” space
 in the dialectic between fundamentalism and
 Western liberalism from where we can begin to formulate
 new questions about the nature of blasphemy.60
Obviously, this type of metaphor is central to the book. The phrase “satanic 
verses” occurs several times throughout and is used in various contexts. In a 
way, the entire book can be regarded as metaphorical, maybe in a literary 
rather than in a linguistic sense––although even this distinction becomes 
blurred. 
Blasphemy operates at various levels in The Satanic Verses. It could be 
described as the alternate rendering of that which is considered sacred and 
immutable, as a result of the commingling of migration and translation into 
something new and possibly hybrid. Sometimes, it sheds light on that which 
is best left unsaid and combines the profane with the godly in a single breath. 
As Sanga has put it, blasphemy seems to be “the act of saying the unsayable 
and […] thinking the unthinkable” (Sanga 2001: 108). Or, in Levy’s (1995: 
557) words, “one person’s free speech [is] another’s blasphemy” if the laws 
intended to prevent offences to certain religious groups curb its dissenter’s 
rights to the freedom of speech. In effect, the definition of religion has always 
seemed to pose an insuperable problem for any laws on blasphemy. In The 
Satanic Verses himself, Baal, the dissenter, utters a statement which seems 
to reflect Rushdie’s own stance: “Where there is no belief, there is no 
blasphemy” (TSV 380). 
Rushdie depicts the twelve whores as the Prophet’s wives, renames the Holy 
City of Mecca into Jahilia (which, in Arabic, means ‘ignorance’) and 
59 Song by the Rolling Stones, from their album Beggar’s Banquet, phonetic rendering of 
Mick Jagger’s refrain, “Pleased to meet you…hope you guess my name”. These lyrics are 
one of the leitmotifs used by Rushdie throughout the novel The Satanic Verses.
60 Sanga, Jaina, Salman Rushdie’s Postcolonial Metaphors, Connecticut, 2001, p 129.
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Mohammad himself into Mahound (an epithet employed by Islam-hating 
Christians in medieval times to epitomise Mohammed as a false prophet, or 
even the devil’s agent), thereby casting doubt upon the inclusion and later 
exclusion of three Islamic divinities, and fictionally reworks certain parts of 
the Q’uran––all distinctive acts of blasphemy according to Islamic faith, even 
more so as several instances uncover its inherent inconsistencies and 
ambiguities. Levy (1995: 559) quotes Rushdie’s interview with an Indian 
journal, where he said that no subjects were off-limits, including God and the 
prophets, and that, even if people got ‘upset’ by the irreverence of his book, 
he had felt the need to write about religion and revelation from his own, 
secular, point of view. Rushdie seems to apply Western standards to the 
construction of the Q’uran, which means ‘recitation’, i.e., of God to the 
Prophet, and this in itself is considered a heresy, and a heinous crime. 
Rushdie’s tone, at times, ventures into the flippant, even satirical, providing 
and retracting information in the same breath, and thus violates the 
sacredness of his quarry even more. The fact that Mahound impersonates 
the Prophet has angered the latter’s devout followers even further (even 
though the Prophet’s name is not mentioned a single time throughout the 
entire book), and it remains unclear whether the repudiation of the 
questionable verses he originally heard from Gibreel was caused by the latter 
or even by Mahound himself:
“It was the devil,” he says aloud to the empty air, making it true by 
giving it voice… This is what he has heard in his listening, that he 
has been tricked, that the Devil came to him in the guise of the 
archangel, so that the verses he memorized, the ones he recited 
in the poetry tent, were not the real thing but its diabolic opposite, 
not godly but satanic. (TSV p 123)
Repeatedly, Salman Rushdie has stressed that he intended no blasphemy 
when writing his controversial book. Rather, he sought to highlight the 
juxtaposition of good and evil throughout the novel. One such opposition are 
the brothel and the harem, pictured as antithetical worlds, and both are 
intended for sequestering women, either for their own men or for strangers. 
The fact that the twelve whores assume the names of the Prophet’s wives 
was not intended as an insult to the faith: “The two struggling worlds, pure 
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and impure, are juxtaposed by making them echoes of one another; and, 
finally, the pure eradicates the impure” (In Good Faith, Imaginary Homelands
1992: 401). This way, again something new is created, and it embodies that 
which the migrant is faced with on a day-to-day basis. Traditional Islamic 
values are shattered by their confrontation with Western liberalism, and the 
migrant is forced to make a choice––one way or another. However, Rushdie 
seems to be saying that by creating a new identity for himself, the migrant is 
taking on the role of God (TSV p 49)––and, to all intents and purposes, this is 
blasphemy. 
Much of the novel The Satanic Verses is based on Islamic tradition, and on 
the (divine? archangelic?) revelations of Mohammad the Prophet, written 
down into the Q’uran, Islam’s holy scripture, which is considered the absolute 
and undiluted, ergo divine, truth by Muslim fundamentalists. 
3.3.6 Globalisation
Sanga (2001: 131) has included this issue in her treatise of Rushdie’s 
postcolonial metaphors, and even goes so far as to refer to the author 
himself as the metaphor of globalism, saying that, in his fiction, worlds that 
cannot normally be reconciled collide, thus exposing the limitations of art as 
such and highlighting the fallacy of history. Globalisation seems to have 
replaced imperialism, the only difference, at least according to Tomlinson
(1991: 175, quoted in Sanga 2001: 140), lying in the fact that “it is a far less 
coherent or culturally directed process…” 
Other than that, I have found it very difficult to discover a useful definition of 
the term “globalisation” in Sanga’s article, and mostly it was intended to aid in 
the analysis of another novel of Rushdie’s, The Ground Beneath Her Feet, 
anyway, so I shall put this metaphor ‘on the backburner’, to use an American 
metaphor, and continue with other, more interesting and informative issues. 
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3.3.7 Dreams
Dreaming is our gift; it may also be our tragic flaw.61
In this novel, dreams and visions play a central part. In a way, these dreams 
of Gibreel Farishta’s hold the book together; they provide the subplots, the 
‘veil of illusion’. For Rushdie, dreaming is very important as a definition of our 
humanity:
The dream is part of our very essence. Given the gift of self-
consciousness, we can dream versions of ourselves, new selves 
for old. Waking as well as sleeping, our response to the world is 
essentially imaginative: that is, picture-making. We live in our 
pictures, our ideas. I mean this literally. We first construct pictures 
of the world and then we step inside the frames. We come to 
equate the pictures with the world, so that, in certain 
circumstances, we will even go to war because we find someone 
else’s picture less pleasing than our own.62
By superimposing these dream sequences, or hallucinations, upon the more 
realistic account of events, Rushdie questions the reliability of our own 
senses as well as that of historical records and religious writings. Gibreel’s 
identity seems to crack up, to fall apart irreparably, and thus unmasks its 
multiplicity. 
3.3. 8 Names
Rushdie has given many of his protagonists Indian names that represent an 
allegory of their respective character. Chamcha, for instance, literally means 
‘spoon’ in Urdu, and this is why Gibreel often dubs him ‘Spoono’ (which 
Saladin doesn’t particularly like). However, a chamcha is also a sycophant, 
which could describe the sycophantic Indian servants of British Sahibs, and 
in our case, the sycophantic way in which Saladin is trying to ‘suck up’ to the 
English in order to become one of them. His profession as a voice-over artist 
yields further evidence of his sycophantic nature; although his skin is dark his 
English accent is faultless, and people need not look at him when he speaks 
61 Rushdie 1992: 378
62ibid.
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(as his outspoken lover Zeeny Vakil points out to him). So, as Sanga (2001:
66) emphasises, to miss the idiosyncratic meaning of Saladin Chamcha’s 
name is to miss “one of the most crucial points in the novel”. Gibreel is his 
other self, and his name in Arabic means ‘Gabriel’, while Farishta is the Urdu 
and Persian word for ‘angel’. Just like the archangel he purports to be, he 
constructs his own version of Islam. 
Giving the twelve prostitutes in the most famous Jahilian brothel the names 
of Mohammad’s wives is another instance of the referential power of naming; 
Rushdie earned heavy criticism for this linguistic feat, even though he later 
stressed that it was just intended to show that the good always defeats the 
evil––it is no coincidence that ultimately, the whores forget their own names.
This motif of dual identity and disruption pervades the entire opus; Baal the 
poet is paired with the writer and also with Mahound, the prophet. Salman the 
Persian, a scribe, is both a figure in the novel and the author himself, and at 
times we cannot be sure (not even Mahound can distinguish between them) 
whether Gibreel Farishta is human, an angel, or the devil incarnate. The 
concepts of UP and DOWN are blurred, they are resolved into a ‘space 
between’, where difference becomes sameness and vice versa, it no longer 
matters. 
As Sanga (2001) repeatedly points out, any distinction between the said 
metaphors in Rushdie’s fiction can only be artificial as they are all inextricably 
intertwined and involve each other in any discussion about a single one of 
them. 
3.3.9 Death
Those who listen to the Devil’s verses,
 spoken in the Devil’s tongue,
will go to the Devil in the end
(TSV p 484)
The novel begins and ends with allusions to death: “To be born again, first 
you have to die” (TSV p 3) and “If the old refused to die, the new could not be 
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born” (TSV p 547).  Other passages echo this fundamental statement, such 
as the one referring to Pamela Chamcha’s lucky escape from an untimely 
end in a car crash (TSV p 182), only to die later in a fire laid by herself, and 
the entire book seems to reflect the phoenix metaphor in its underlying truth. 
Inseparably linked to the notion of death, however, is that of falling. The 
concept of verticality can be followed from the very beginning of the novel, 
where Gibreel and Chamcha fall from the skies and undergo certain 
metamorphoses, but survive. Others are less lucky: Rekha Merchant, 
Gibreel’s ex-lover in Bombay, meets her end by leaping from a high-rise after 
hurling her children to the concrete below (even if her spectre, floating about 
on a flying rug, continues to haunt Gibreel throughout the book); Pamela 
Chamcha’s parents had committed suicide by a similar method; and even 
Alleluia Cone, the mountaineer who is accustomed to heights, even revels in 
them, ironically meets her fate by being pushed (by Gibreel) from the roof of 
a sky-scraper. Thus, the metaphor UP IS GOOD seems to be inverted in this 
novel as the protagonists are always the danger of falling to their death. 
3.4. Die Satanischen Verse––metaphor translated
We are caught in metaphors. They transfigure us
 and reveal the meaning of our lives.
Salman Rushdie63
3.4.1 General remarks
When I first read Rushdie (I think I started with Shame) I was fascinated by 
the rich, colourful and, for me, alien language, the like of which I had never 
come across before. Later, when I started working as a translator and read 
other novels by Salman Rushdie, I always thought that his writing must be
utterly untranslatable––it is so specifically Anglo-Indian, so ‘Hinglish’, so how 
on earth could one transfer this into another language? At this point, Umberto 
Eco (2003: 74) gave me some food for thought: Talking about the “rewriting 
that pushes the limits of the original creation” he quotes Humboldt, who said 
that translating meant not only leading the reader to an understanding of the 
63 “The Firebird’s Nest“, The New Yorker (23 June 1997), quoted by J. Sanga 2001: 1
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language and culture of the original but also enriching one’s own language––
as Rushdie has done in all his works. He has created something entirely 
new, so why shouldn’t something equally new be created in German (or any 
other language The Satanic Verses has been translated into)? (Interestingly, 
both Eco and Humboldt talk about James Joyce’s and Günter Grass’s work, 
to which Rushdie’s has been frequently likened.) The German version of The
Satanic Verses finally appeared in October 1989, after much ado, games of 
journalistic hide-and-seek and political razzmatazz. 
First and foremost, a translator is a reader who interprets the respective 
piece of literature in a unique way, and therefore his work is coloured by his 
own personality. Reception, interpretation, and translation are inseparable, 
and especially when dealing with an altogether different culture a translator is 
easily overtaxed. The dialectics of translation is often underestimated, and 
most criticism either praises or criticises, without providing better alternatives. 
The German version of The Satanic Verses, with its 707 pages, is 
significantly thicker than the 547 pages of the English original––which may 
surprise Vlasta (2002: 189) but not the seasoned English-German translator 
who knows that translations from English into German usually gain at least 
10% volume (a fact that sometimes perturbs the clients). Vlasta (ibid.)
criticises the slightly pompous style of alleged translator Gisela Stege (who 
preferred to remain anonymous due to the fatwa that was extended to other 
persons involved in the promotion and distribution of The Satanic Verses), 
saying that it is old-fashioned, exalted, and inaccurate while conceding that 
the translator must have been under extreme time pressure in view of the 
political situation of the time, and therefore sacrificed stylistic subtlety to 
content. Moreover, there are several inconsistencies in the method the 
translator deployed in the course of her work. For instance, the first name 
originally assigned to Farishta is Gibreel, which the translator changed into 
Gibriel. One fails to see why she has done so, except maybe for phonetic 
reasons (inconsistently, as she should have changed all the other names in a 
similar way to retain their original sound). The German name would have 
been Gabriel, spelt just like the English counterpart and pronounced similarly, 
and it evokes religious associations, as the strange form used by Ms Stege 
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does not (and therefore founders). She has also changed the name of 
Ayesha (the Prophet’s wife, the whore and the butterfly leader) to Aischa, 
again for no apparent reason.
I tend to agree with Vlasta that it is rather a shame to rush through the 
translation of such a monumental piece of literature. Still, her arguments 
seem a bit thin to me, and her comparison of the two versions is far from 
exhaustive as it was not the main focus of her paper. 
An investigation of how the translator of the The Satanic Verses has solved 
the problem of metaphor translation in general, as well as specific cases, with 
special focus on the types of metaphor mentioned above, yields a number of 
interesting examples. In order to be able to evaluate the quality and 
appropriateness of some of the translator’s choices, I originally planned to 
follow the procedure suggested by K. Schmid-Gallistl (1996) in her doctoral 
thesis, which consists in analysing the ontological and epistemic 
correspondences of the English and the German versions, respectively, 
happy to have found a ‘scientific lifeline’ as intuition, one of the translator’s 
most rewarding tools, seemed to carry too little weight in an academic paper. 
However, in the course of my research, I have discovered the limitations if 
not shortcomings of this method as it focuses too strongly on two aspects of 
metaphoric thought processes, i.e. those of epistemic and the ontological 
mapping, and disregards other, equally important factors, not least the 
cultural aspect. The procedure proposed by Schmid-Gallistl moreover struck 
me as too lengthy and repetitive, artificial even, and therefore quite useless 
for practical translating. 
Much more to the point, and much more helpful for understanding the way 
metaphorical processing functions, have I found Lakoff and Turner’s (1989: 
8) definitions of the devices of poetic thought, such as extending, elaborating, 
questioning, compressing, and personifying metaphors, as already 
mentioned in chapter 1.1, whereas Steen’s checklist for metaphor analysis 
(in Cameron 1999: 81), again, seems too lengthy and complicated a 
procedure to be really useful for the evaluation of the translated metaphor, 
although no doubt it is extremely valuable for analysing systematic metaphor. 
It seemed to make more sense to focus on various aspects of the respective 
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passages, and to discuss their shortcomings individually. I shall now provide 
a number of examples translated from English into German64.
3.4.2 Sample translations
All metaphors are capable of misinterpretation
(TSV page 537)
I have chosen some of the metaphors which I consider the most striking and 
tried to discover their German counterpart in the translated version of the 
novel The Satanic Verses. Naturally, there is no need for a complete analysis 
of all metaphors deployed here by Salman Rushdie. 
Metaphors that refer to blasphemy, God and Satan, the archangel Gabriel, 
prophets, Mohammad and the Q’uran are part of my analysis, but other 
metaphorical concepts such as life and death, flying and falling, animals and 
people, sand and water, cities, colours etc. will also be dealt with in this 
chapter, always with a view to their translation and translatability. 
3.4.2.1 (More or less) Successful translations
Example 1
English version page 531:
“Then all of a sudden Changez Chanchawala [Saladin’s father] left his face; 
he was still alive but he had gone somewhere else, had turned inwards to 
look at whatever there was to see […] He does not avert his eyes but looks 
death right in the face.” (author’s emphasis)
German version page 686:
“Und dann verließ Changez Chanchawala ganz plötzlich sein Gesicht; er 
lebte noch, aber er war irgendwo anders hingegangen, hatte sich nach innen 
64 I am, alas, limited to my two ‘mother tongues’ and therefore unable to evaluate the Indian 
aspects––although some have very obviously been ‘botched’ by the translator even for the 
laywoman’s eyes. 
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gekehrt, um, was immer da war, anzuschauen […] Er schlägt die Augen nicht 
nieder, sondern blickt dem Tod direkt ins Gesicht.”
This container metaphor (THE HUMAN BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE 
SOUL) has been translated correctly, using German idioms and phrases 
while still keeping the original image (DEATH IS A PERSON).
Example 2
English version page 547:
“If the old refused to die, the new could not be born.”
German version page 707:
“Wenn das Alte sich weigerte zu sterben, konnte das Neue nicht geboren 
werden.”
This sentence taken from the end of the narrative is also the beginning of the 
story, a song sung by Gibreel Farishta while he plunges towards the sea. It 
implies that phases of one’s life, or attitudes, chances, etc., are like people 
(personification metaphor, CHANGE IS DEATH or CHANGE IS BIRTH, 
respectively). The English version incorporates both past and conditional, 
which the German does not, but that is due to grammatical differences 
between the languages and must be regarded as one of the inevitable losses 
we incur through translation. 
Example 3
English version page 534:
“An orphaned life, like Muhammad’s, like everyone’s. A life illuminated by a 
strangely radiant death, which continued to glow, in his mind’s eye, like a sort 
of magic lamp.”
German version page 691:
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“Ein Leben als Waise, wie das Muhammads, wie das aller. Ein Leben, 
erleuchtet von einem seltsam strahlendem Tod, der vor seinem geistigen 
Auge wie eine Art Wunderlampe weiterglomm.”
The German version is a literal translation of Rushdie’s metaphors of life and 
death. My claim that original, novel metaphor (or even extended metaphor if 
we take into account that LIFE IS A PATH that can be illuminated) is the 
easiest to translate seems to hold true in this case also, even if, in German, it 
does not have the same onomatopoeic power. One could of course argue 
that an orphaned life could be better translated as ein verwaistes Leben
although in German it could be understood ambiguously, namely also as an 
empty life. Possibly, Waisenleben would be the most appropriate translation 
of an orphaned life. 
Example 4
English version page 314:
“I could have learned him, step by step, climbed him to the very summit. 
Denied mountains by my weak-boned feet, I’d have looked for the mountain 
in him: establishing base camp, sussing out routes, negotiating ice-falls, 
crevasses, overhangs. I’d have assaulted the peak and seen the angels 
dance. O, but he’s dead and at the bottom of the sea.”
German version page 416:
“Ich hätte ihn kennenlernen können, ganz allmählich, hätte ihn bis zum Gipfel 
besteigen können. Da mir meine schwachen Füße die Berge verweigern, 
hätte ich den Berg in ihm gesucht: das Basislager aufgeschlagen, Routen 
geprüft, gefrorene Wasserfälle, Gletscherspalten, Überhänge bezwungen. 
Ich hätte den Gipfel in Angriff genommen und die Engel tanzen sehen. Aber 
er ist tot und liegt auf dem Grund des Meeres.”
The metaphor MAN IS A MOUNTAIN, created by Rushdie to reflect Alleluia 
Cone’s profession and applied to her lover Gibreel, has been retained in all 
its aspects. The most apparent weakness in this passage lies in the verb 
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besteigen as it has strong, overt sexual connotations in German that are only 
hinted at in the English original. In addition, Rushdie’s use of the verb to learn
with a human object is non-standard usage (to learn about or to learn to 
know) but rather poetic licence. The German verb kennenlernen does not 
have the same physical impact or its erotic overtones. 
Example 5
English version page 97:
“‘A poet’s work,’ he [Baal the satirist] answers. ‘To name the unnamable, to 
point at frauds, to take sides, start arguments, shape the world and stop it 
from going to sleep.’ And if rivers of blood flow from the cuts his verses inflict, 
then they will nourish him.”
German version page 134:
“‘Die Aufgabe des Dichters”, antwortet er. “Das Unnennbare zu benennen, 
Betrug aufzudecken, Stellung zu beziehen, Auseinandersetzungen in Gang 
zu bringen, die Welt zu gestalten und sie am Einschlafen zu hindern.’ Und 
wenn aus den Wunden, die seine Verse reißen, Ströme von Blut fließen, so 
werden sie ihn nähren.”
Most of the metaphors (VERSES ARE WEAPONS, THE WORLD IS A 
PERSON etc.) deployed in the original have been successfully transferred 
into German, apart from the fact that a fraud is a fraudulent person (the 
criminal) while the German word Betrug (the crime) is an abstract noun and a 
better translation would have been Betrüger entlarven (leaving out zu in all 
instances here, as the German infinitive with zu expresses purpose). 
Personally, I would also prefer to translate the verb shape with formen not 
gestalten (design) as the latter has fewer physical entailments. All the other 
metaphors, however, retain the original implications as they evoke very 
similar images in the reader’s mind.
Example 6
English version page 288:
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“He chose Lucretius over Ovid. The inconstant soul, the mutability of 
everything, das Ich, every last speck. A being going through life can become
so other to himself as to be another, discrete, severed from history.”
German version page 383:
“Er entschied sich für Lukrez und gegen Ovid. Die wandelbare Seele, die 
Veränderlichkeit allen Seins, des Ichs, jedes kleinsten Atoms. Ein Wesen, 
das durch das Leben geht, kann sich so weit von sich selbst entfernen, daß 
es ein anderes wird, getrennt, losgelöst von der Geschichte.”
Basically, this translation works quite well, apart from some register 
incongruence (e.g. speck is more Staubkörnchen than atom) but the LIFE IS 
A JOURNEY metaphor has been retained in all its aspects. What must be 
pointed out, though, is that, for no apparent reason, the German enumeration 
“die Veränderlichkeit allen Seins, des Ichs, jedes kleinsten Atoms“ suddenly 
contains genitive forms while the English original merely provides a list.
Example 7
English version page 34:
“How had the past (i) bubbled up, in (ii) transmogrified vowels and vocab?”
German version page 52:
“Wie war es möglich, daß die Vergangenheit (i) wieder aufstieg, in Form (ii) 
gänzlich veränderter Vokale und Vokabeln?”
I have given this particular sentence a lot of thought but it seems to be one of 
the cases where the metaphor has to be watered down from (i) bubbling to 
mere rising up (aufsteigen) which merely retains the rising movement but 
forgoes the metaphor THE MIND IS A LAKE or some such. The bubbles also 
suggest that we remember the past more in bits and pieces than in a single 
go, not simultaneously but over a course of time, as it emerges from the 
murky waters of our memories. If this metaphor proved difficult to transfer, (ii) 
transmogrified must have floored the translator completely. According to 
dictionary.com, the pseudo-Latin verb ‘to transmogrify’ means “to change in 
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appearance or form, esp. strangely or grotesquely; [to] transform”65, which is 
not reflected by the German translation as it leaves out the element of the 
grotesque or bizarre. Still, it does highlight a vast change in Chamcha’s 
usually so refined English as he seems to be reclaimed by his unmistakable 
Indian heritage and culture. 
Example 8
English version page 180:
“[Pamela] realized that Chamcha was not in love with her at all, but with that 
(i) voice stinking of Yorkshire pudding and hearts of oak, that (ii) hearty, 
rubicund voice of (iii) ye olde dream-England which he so desperately 
wanted to inhabit.”
German version page 241:
“[Pamela wußte], daß Chamcha nicht in sie verliebt war, sondern in diese (i) 
Stimme, die nach Yorkshirepudding und Eichenkernholz stank, diese (ii) 
joviale, rosige Stimme des (iii) guten alten Traum-Englands, in dem er so 
schrecklich gern gelebt hätte.”
Voices play a central part in Saladin Chamcha’s life; being a so-called voice-
over artist, he can imitate any voice but the one he most strives for is Pamela 
Lovelace’s, his former wife’s, refined speech as it so clearly reflects her high 
social status. She, however, calls it the bane of her life, and violently rejects it 
because her father, a classical scholar, had passed on The Voice to her but 
then committed suicide together with his wife, and Pamela could never 
forgive them for it. Rushdie describes this voice in very colourful terms (e.g. 
“a voice composed of tweeds, headscarves, summer pudding, hockey-sticks, 
thatched houses, saddle-soap, house-parties, nuns, family pews, large dogs 
and philistinism”, page 180) that conjure up a clear image of social class but 
always adding something derogatory such as the verb stink. The translator 
has solved the difficult task of transferring these attributes into German really 
65 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/transmogrified
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well, keeping the original metaphor that adds substance to something 
insubstantial, i.e., Pamela’s voice. 
3.4.2.2 Less successful translations
Example 1
English version page 35:
“Damn you, India […] To (i) hell with you, I (ii) escaped your clutches long 
ago, you won’t get your (iii) hooks into me again, you cannot (iv) drag me 
back.”
German version page 53:
“Verdammtes Indien […] (i) Hol dich der Teufel, ich bin (ii) deinen Klauen vor 
langer Zeit (ii) entkommen, (iii) mich kriegst du nicht mehr (iii) in die Finger, 
dir (iv) geh ich nicht mehr (iv) ins Netz.”
While in the English example all three metaphors used for the country of 
India––clutches, hooks, drag––are consistent, the German choices simply do 
not gel: clutches (Klauen) do not go with (iii) fingers (Finger) and a spider’s 
web (Netz), three different images (predator, human, spider, respectively) are 
evoked here, compared to a single one in the original text, that is, India 
resembles a hungry beast (+ANIMAL, +PREDATOR, –HUMAN). Here, the 
conceptual metaphor A COUNTRY IS A PREDATOR is novel, while the 
linguistic phrases themselves, through cleverly combined by Rushdie, are 
not.
Suggested alternative:
“Fahr zur Hölle, ich bin deinen Klauen vor langer Zeit entkommen, deine 
Krallen können mich nicht mehr fassen, du kannst mich nicht zurückzerren.”
Example 2
English version page 525:
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“The things one’s memory threw up!”
German version page 679:
“Was die Erinnerung nicht alles hochspülte!”
The metaphor THE MIND IS A CONTAINER is underlined by the pun to 
throw up that plays upon the literal meaning of the phrase and the semi-literal 
meaning of ‘to vomit’. To wash up (as in driftwood on the beach), which 
would be the translation of hochspülen, does not have the same impact. 
Suggested alternative:
“Was einem nicht alles im Gedächtnis hochkam!”
Example 3
English version page 520:
“The future, even when it was only a (i) question-shrouded (ii) glimmer, (iii) 
would not be (iv) eclipsed by the past; even when death moved towards the 
(v) centre of the stage, life went on fighting for equal rights.”
German version page 672:
“Die Zukunft, auch wenn es66 nur ein (i) von Fragen vernebeltes (ii) 
Schimmern war, (iii) würde nicht von der Vergangenheit (iv) verdunkelt
werden; selbst wenn der Tod sich der (v) Bühnenmitte näherte, fuhr das 
Leben fort, um Gleichberechtigung zu kämpfen.”
The metaphors FUTURE IS LIFE / PAST IS DEATH and FUTURE IS LIGHT 
/ PAST IS DARKNESS may have been retained in the German rendering but 
they have been watered down. (i) A shroud implicates death; the German 
word Nebel, however, is just a weather-phenomenon, which is far too weak 
to match the English original. (ii) Glimmer, too, is more than just Schimmer
(faint glow), and an (iv) eclipse replaces light with darkness, whereas the 
verb verdunkeln merely means to darken, thus losing the stark contrasts 
66 In German, the noun “Zukunft” is female, therefore the pronoun here should be “sie” not 
“es”.
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used by Rushdie. Moreover, (iii) would not be eclipsed can, grammatically 
speaking, be read in two different ways (‘was unwilling to’ vs. the conditional 
‘would not’) whereas the German rendering only allows for a single 
interpretation. Furthermore, the (v) centre of the stage is an English idiom 
from the world of theatre which cannot be compared to simple Bühnenmitte
in German. 
Suggested alternative:
“Die Zukunft, auch als sie nur ein durch Fragen verhülltes Glühen war, würde 
sich niemals durch das Leichentuch der Vergangenheit verfinstern lassen; 
auch wenn der Tod mehr und mehr das Rampenlicht suchte, kämpfte das 
Leben weiterhin um gleiches Recht.“
Example 4
English version page 539:
“Gibreel’s old problem of (i) sulphurous halitosis had evidently (ii) returned
(iii) with a vengeance.”
German version page 697:
“Gibrils altes Problem – sein (i) schwefeliger Mundgeruch – war offensichtlich 
(iii) in alter Frische (ii) wieder aufgetaucht.”
In English, (i) Mundgeruch is merely bad breath, whereas halitosis is more a 
medical term that is not as widely known. (ii) Return is synonymous with ‘to 
come back’ and therefore a metaphor of general horizontal motion; (ii) 
auftauchen means ‘to surface’ and therefore implies vertical movement in 
water. To translate the English idiom (iii) with a vengeance with (iii) in alter 
Frische (in its old freshness) in the context of halitosis is a rather daring feat, 
which strikes the reader as rather funny (which was hardly Rushdie’s
intention) and surely requires no further explanation. 
Suggested alternative:
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“Gibreels altes Problem, sein schwefelsaurer Odem, war zurückgekehrt, 
noch stärker als je zuvor.”
Example 5
English version page 546:
“[…] and about how he [Chamcha] (i) was going to die for his verses, but 
could not (ii) find it in himself to (iii) call the death sentence unjust.”
German version page 705:
“[…] und er dachte daran, wie er selbst (i) wohl für seine Verse (i) sterben 
würde, und daß es (ii) ihm nicht möglich war, das Todesurteil ungerecht zu 
(iii) nennen.”
Apart from the author’s autobiographical cynicism, this sentence contains 
three aspects that have proved difficult for the translator. Was going to die
implies that Chamcha is absolutely sure about his imminent death; (i) wohl 
sterben würde, by comparison, is far too weak to reflect this certainty. The 
container metaphor (THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE SOUL) of the 
English original (ii) find it in himself has got lost in the translation, the wording 
of which is also far too insipid to reflect how Chamcha racked his brain, and 
probably also plumbed his conscience, only to come up with the same death 
sentence. Moreover, the verb (iii) nennen is not the ‘mot juste’ in this context 
as it has nothing to do with the naming of things but rather with the way he
regards the death sentence. 
Suggested alternative:
“[…] und er dachte daran, daß er sicher für seine Verse sterben mußte, doch 
in ihm war nichts, das dieses Todesurteil als ungerecht bezeichnen konnte.”
Example 6
English version page 545:
“Sisodia […] had finally bumped accidentally into death.”
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German version page 705:
“Sisodia […] [war] zufällig dem Tod über den Weg [gelaufen].”
To bump into something or somebody is a widely spread English idiom 
(although not usually associated with death) that implies contact with 
something solid, corporeal. The German phrase über den Weg laufen also 
refers to chance meetings but, when combined with death, does not have the 
same impact as no physical contact is implied by it. The metaphor would be 
DEATH IS SOLID and in English it is static whereas in German it moves 
down a path. 
Suggested alternative:
“Letztendlich war Sisodia zufällig in den Tod gestolpert.”
Example 7
English version page 432:
“[…] to damage that trust”
German version page 565:
“[…] das Vertrauen zu zerstören”
The German word zerstören is much too strong; it would be ‘destroy’ in 
English, which is not implied in this metaphor. Although the translator has 
kept the metaphor TRUST IS A THING that can be damaged or destroyed, 
she has overstepped the line. 
Suggested alternatives:
“das Vertrauen zu beschädigen/schmälern”
Example 8
English version page 439:
97
“O, he [Gibreel] was (i) in a high good humour that day, (ii) rubbishing
London and the English (iii) with much of his old brio.”
German version page 574
“Oh, er war an jenem Tag (i) in Hochstimmung, (ii) schwafelte (iii) mit nahezu 
altem Brio über London und die Engländer.”
Whereas (i) has been translated to reflect the original idiom, (ii) is, again, 
much too weak. Schwafeln would be the same as ‘to waffle’, which makes it 
an inappropriate word in this context. In (iii) the possessive adjective has 
been left out in the German rendering, and the word Brio is not as familiar to 
the speaker of German as the latter does not have the same musical 
connotation (‘con brio’ meaning ‘with verve’).
Suggested alternative:
“Oh, er war an jenem Tag in bester Laune, fast so ätzend wie früher zog er 
mit Wonne über London und die Engländer her.”
Example 9
English version page 437
“[…] and (i) picked their way through (ii) broiling, horizontal (iii) secretarial 
flesh.”
German version page 572:
“[…] und (i) bahnten sich einen Weg durch (ii) röstendes horizontales (iii) 
Sekretärinnenfleisch.”
To (i) pick one’s way implies that one has to step over things (that may be 
disgusting) whereas sich einen Weg bahnen is more of a ploughing 
movement, which, in this particular case, sends the mind boggling. Although 
the cooking metaphor of (ii) roasting (iii) meat has been kept in the German 
translation, it is too literal. What sounds novel in English (even if the 
metaphor of roasting in the sun is reasonably well-known) in German sounds 
utterly ridiculous, even faintly nauseating, although the phrase in der Sonne 
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braten is widely spread. Flesh would be better translated as Haut (skin) as 
Fleisch is more meat than flesh, but I would prefer to leave it out altogether.
Translating the English horizontal verbatim would imply that the secretaries 
are ladies of the night, so to speak, 
Suggested alternative:
“[…] und suchten vorsichtig einen Weg zwischen bodendeckenden, 
sonnendurchglühten Sekretärinnen.”
Example 10
English version page 457:
“Wrestling, through his many stories, he [Gibreel] proceeds.”
German version page 597:
“Ringend schreitet er durch seine vielen Geschichten voran.”
Nowadays, the term for the sport of wrestling is never translated into 
German, as Ringen sounds rather old-fashioned and does not imply the 
same degree of tough fighting. Moreover, the German verb ringen is 
transitive and requires a prepositional complement, which is missing here. 
The metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY applies to both the original sentence and 
its translation but the latter is clumsy. 
Suggested alternative:
“Und er kämpft sich durch seine vielen Geschichten weiter.”
Example 11
English version page 518:
“Fact is, […] religious fafaith, which (i) encodes the (ii) highest ass ass 
aspirations of human race, is now, in our cocountry, the servant of (ii) lowest 
instincts, and gogo God (iii) is the creature of evil.”
German version page 671:
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“Tatsache ist, […] daß der religiöse Gla-glaube, welcher die höhö-(ii) 
höchsten Ziele der menschlichen Rasse (i) einschließt, in unserem Land zum 
Didi-Diener der (ii) niedersten Instinkte und Gogo-Gott zum Wesen des 
Bösen (iii) geworden ist.”
This sentiment is expressed by stuttering producer Whisky Sisodia sitting 
next to Chancha on the flight to Bombay. Apart from the clever use of 
Sisodia’s linguistic disability, which gets utterly lost in the translation, the 
sentence incorporates the universal metaphor of (ii) UP IS GOOD and 
DOWN IS BAD in either language (highest––höchsten, lowest––niedersten). 
One may dispute the fact whether aspiration can be translated as Ziel (goal), 
or point out that it should be niedrigste not niederste Instinkte, the fact 
remains that the original metaphor has been retained. What has been 
altered, though, is the difference between state and process: (iii) is has been 
changed to geworden ist (has become), which certainly is not part of the 
original metaphor since it implies a process, i.e., that of change, and not a 
state. Furthermore, (i) encode means that something has been put into words
whereas einschließen means merely to incorporate, implying that there is 
more involved. 
Suggested alternative:
“Es ist einfach so, daß die Religion, der Gaga-Glaube, der das menschliche 
Sch Sch Streben nach dem Höchsten ausdrückt, bei uns jetzt der Dldi-Diener 
der niedrigsten Instinkte ist, und Gogo-Gott ist das Geschöpf des Bösen.” 
Example 12
English version page 168
“They describe us […] That’s all. They have the (i) power of description, and 
we (ii) succumb to the pictures they (iii) construct.”
German version page 226
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“Sie beschreiben uns […] Das ist alles. Sie haben die (i) Macht der 
Beschreibung, und wir sind den Bildern (ii) unterworfen, die sie sich von uns 
(iii) machen.”
The metaphor deployed by Rushdie is LANGUAGE IS A WEAPON, as (i) 
power and (ii) succumb imply war. As in a situation of war, they has no 
immediate referent but everybody involved knows who ‘they’ are––the others, 
the enemy. The power of description means that the ‘powers that be’ have 
the power to describe lesser mortals, i.e. the process, while Macht der 
Beschreibung, literally translated into German, has a different deep structure 
as it refers to the end result, i.e. the product, the person described. The 
German translation takes this into account but the passive structure (ii) 
unterworfen sein does not match the original. The verb (iii) construct is 
stronger and more physical than the verb machen, which simply means 
‘make’. Moreover, the author does not mention pictures ‘of us’ (von uns) but 
images in general, which means that the translator has added her own 
interpretation. 
Suggested alternative:
“Sie beschreiben uns [...] Sie haben die Macht des Bezeichnens, und wir 
unterwerfen uns den von ihnen entworfenen Bildern.”
Example 13
English version page 205
“The exile is a (i) ball hurled high into the air. He (ii) hangs there, (iii) frozen in 
time, (iv) translated into a (v) photograph; (vi) denied motion, suspended 
impossibly above his native earth, he awaits the inevitable moment at which 
the photograph must begin to move, and the earth reclaim its own. 
German version page
“Das Exil ist ein (i) Ball, der hoch in die Luft geschleudert wird. Und dort (ii) 
hängenbleibt: (iii) gefroren in der Zeit (iv) verwandelt in eine (v) Fotografie, 
eine (vi) aufgehobene Bewegung; in unmöglicher Position über seiner 
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heimatlichen Erde, wartet er auf den unvermeidlichen Augenblick, wenn die 
Fotografie sich bewegen und die Erde ihr Eigentum zurückfordern muß.”
This passage especially illustrates the ingenuity of the author and, at the 
same time, the translator’s shortcomings. Apart from the fact that the English 
word exile here refers to a person (to be gleaned from the personal pronoun 
he at the beginning of the second sentence), while the German word Exil is 
an abstract noun, leaving the pronoun er (he) without a referent, and 
disregarding the punctuation errors of the translator’s, several other aspects 
must be mentioned. Point (i) fails due to the abstract noun; he hangs there is 
not the same as hängenbleibt (gets stuck there) as it is more active and 
highlights the metaphor EXILE IS IMMOBILITY that is based upon that of 
TIME IS MOVEMENT. Whereas frozen in time is a well-known English idiom, 
its literal translation into German makes little sense. 
Suggested alternative:
“Der Vertriebene ist ein Ball, den man hoch in die Luft schleudert. Dort hängt 
er dann, wie eingefroren, in einem Photo eingefangen; jeder 
Bewegungsmöglichkeit beraubt, hängt er, aller Wahrscheinlichkeit zum Trotz, 
über seiner Heimaterde und wartet auf den unvermeidlichen Augenblick, in 
dem sich das Foto wieder bewegen und die Schwerkraft zu ihrem Recht 
kommen muß.”
Example 14
English version page 169:
“[…] Chamcha in his utter bewilderment (i) woke and slept as if the two 
conditions (ii) no longer required to be thought of as opposites, but as (iii) 
states that flowed into and out of one another to create a kind of (iv) 
unending delirium of the senses […]”
German version pages 227/228:
““[…] Chamcha, völlig verwirrt, (i) pendelte zwischen Wachen und Schlafen, 
als würden diese (ii) beiden Zustände keine Gegensätze mehr bilden, 
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sondern (iii) ineinander und auseinander fließen in einem (iv) nicht enden 
wollenden Delirium der Sinne […]”
The simplicity of the past tense forms (i) woke and slept leaves no other 
interpretation than the protagonist doing exactly that, whereas the German 
verb pendeln (to commute, or to swerve to and fro) implies that he moves 
between two separate, distant entities or places of his own accord. This is 
then contradicted by the image of two substances flowing into one another 
(iii), a blurring of the conditions of sleep and consciousness, which however 
has been retained in the German rendering. Furthermore, the phrase (ii) 
required to be thought of has been changed to simple ‘were’, which 
considerably changes the meaning. Maybe, to make up for this loss, the 
translator has changed unending to nicht enden wollend (i.e. not wanting to 
end), and, by implying that A CONDITION IS A PERSON capable of 
deliberate action, thus adds an element of intentionality that is not expressed 
by the original. 
Suggested alternative:
“Chamcha, in seiner totalen Verwirrung, glitt vom Wachzustand in den 
Schlaf, als müßten diese beiden Zustände nicht mehr als Gegensätze 
betrachtet werden, sondern als flößen sie ineinander und auseinander 
heraus, um ein Delirium der Sinne hervorzubringen, das niemals aufhörte.”
Example 15
English version page 425:
“My Chamcha may be no Ancient of Venice, my Allie no smothered
Desdemona, Farishta no match for the Moor […]”
German version page 556:
“Mein Chamcha mag zwar kein Fähnrich von Venedig sein, meine Allie keine 
eingestaubte Desdemona, Farishta dem Mohren nicht gewachsen […]”
103
Rushdie quotes Shakespeare here, drawing an analogy between the latter’s 
characters in Othello and his own protagonists, a state of affairs the 
translator has taken into consideration. Höfele (in Müller 1995:78) points 
towards the “story’s subjection to its powerful pre-text”, suggesting that it 
cannot “escape […] from the echo-chamber of literary history” (page 79). 
However, translating the attributive past participle smothered with 
eingestaubt (dusty) changes the meaning considerably. Whereas the former 
is only applied to animate things such as people or maybe animals––it is 
based upon the faculty of breathing––dust can only collect on the inanimate, 
the forgotten and unused.  
Suggested alternative:
“Mein Chamcha mag kein Fähnrich von Venedig sein, meine Allie keine 
halberstickte Desdemona, Farishta dem Mohren nicht gewachsen”
Example 16
English version page 299:
“[…] the man’s not in your league […]” 
German version page 396:
“[…] der Mann ist nicht in deinem Club […]”
This well-known idiom based upon the metaphor MEMBERS OF A SOCIAL 
CLASS ARE A SPORTS TEAM can be translated verbatim (as in (a) below) 
but not with the word Club, which is not the same as Liga (league). It can 
also be transformed into a different metaphor, i.e. SIZE IS STATUS (b),
which is often used as the German counterpart of this idiom.
Suggested alternatives:
(a) “[…] der Mann spielt nicht in deiner Liga […]”
(b) “[…] der Mann ist dir nicht gewachsen […]”
104
Example 17
English version page 421:
“The appointed night arrived: a night of dreadful heat.”
German version page552:
“Die festgelegte Nacht kam: eine Nacht furchtbarer Hitze.”
The euphemism ‘a place of dreadful heat’ directly refers to hell in western 
(Christian) religion and mythology; therefore, much more than just a 
sensation of heat is implied in this short but expressive phrase. 
Suggested alternative:
“Die besagte Nacht war da: eine Nacht heiß wie die Hölle”
Example 18
English version page 335:
“[…] (i) whatever was left of Rekha flew with (ii) vanquished fury (iii) into the 
sun.”
German version page 443:
“[…] (i) was von Rekha geblieben war, flog (ii) ohne Zorn (iii) zur Sonne.”
The personification metaphor that implies that fury can be defeated like an 
opponent in war (FEELINGS ARE PEOPLE) is totally lost in the translation 
as (ii) ohne Zorn simply means ‘without anger’. (iii) Into the sun implies death 
while zur Sonne (to the sun) merely states the direction of Rekha Merchant’s, 
Gibreel’s suicidal ex-lover’s, flight, maybe resembling Icarus’ plight but not 
directly stating this connection. (i) Whatever moreover implies that the 
narrator is unsure as to whether there is anything left of Rekha Merchant at 
all, whereas was (what) signals certainty to the contrary; merely the amount, 
the quantity remains in the dark. 
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Suggested alternative:
“[…] als das, was auch immer von Rekha noch übrig war, in die Sonne flog; 
ihr Zorn war besiegt.”
Example 19
English version page 180:
“It had been a marriage of (i) crossed purposes, each of them (ii) rushing 
towards the very thing from which the other (iii) was in flight.”
German version page 241:
“Es war eine Ehe gewesen, in der sich die (i) Ziele kreuzten wie zwei Züge, 
in der jeder auf das (ii) losraste, wovor der andere (iii) gerade floh.” 
This passage contains the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY or rather 
RELATIONSHIPS ARE PATHS, in this case two different ones crossing one 
another. The English expression (i) crossed purposes is an idiom and 
therefore problematic to translate into another language. Eager to retain the 
metaphor, the translator has added an image, that of trains (Züge), which is 
sometimes necessary, but the outcome strikes me as rather clumsy as in the 
original, man and wife are the ones rushing into different directions whereas 
jeder refers to the trains (although I suspect the translator has overlooked 
this fact). Rushing (ii) and flight (iii) have been translated verbatim as losraste
and gerade floh, respectively, faithful to the path metaphor, although in 
German the former sounds a bit odd (‘rasen’ is usually associated with 
breakneck speed) while the latter implies that the people involved keep 
altering their course (gerade meaning ‘currently’). 
Suggested alternative:
“Es war eine Ehe widersprüchlicher Erwartungen gewesen, in der jeder auf 
genau das zueilte, wovor der andere flüchtete.“
Example 20
English version page 310:
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“A case […] of cashew and monkey nuts.”
German version page 411:
“Ein Fall […] von subkontinentaler Unzurechnungsfähigkeit.”
Allie’s mother Alicja, a Polish Jew living in London, voices her strong 
disapproval of her daughter’s current lover, Gibreel, stating that the latter is 
“a case” (page 310) and further on specifying the kind of case, i.e. “a case of 
cashew and monkey nuts”. Within this context, the pun used by Rushdie here 
strikes me as especially clever as it combines the idiom ‘to be nuts’ with the 
ethnic component implied by monkey and cashew. This is, of course, utterly 
untranslatable and the translator can only make a feeble effort––but not as 
tentative as Ms Stege’s, whose compromise sounds rather feeble indeed.
Subkontinental refers to plants growing on the fringes of continental 
influence67 and is therefore much too vague to reflect Alicja’s strong 
statement that almost borders on the racist. The original nuts expression 
addresses the metaphor MAN IS A BEAST as it refers to nut-eating primates, 
and I have not found an appropriate German alternative, except for the 
compromise below, which at least incorporates the ethnic dimension, even if 
it may not be sufficiently derogatory.
Suggested alternative:
“Ein Fall von ethnisch angehauchtem Wahnsinn”
Example 21
English version page 325:
“Mister, I’ll (i) cook your goose! I’ll (ii) fry your heart and (iii) eat it up on toast!”
German version page 430:
“Mann, ich (i) mach dich fertig! Ich werde (ii) dein Herz braten und (iii) auf 
Toast essen!”
67 “im Randbereich des kontinentalen Einflusses wachsend (von Pflanzen; Bot.)”, in: Duden -
Das große Fremdwörterbuch: Herkunft und Bedeutung der Fremdwörter. Mannheim, Leipzig, 
Wien, Zürich: Dudenverlag 2003.
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Just like in the Fat Cat cartoon (see foreword), the author uses idioms from 
the world of cookery which have little to do with anybody’s culinary efforts. 
These (dead) metaphors cannot be translated into German verbatim, but still 
the translator’s choices seem to be not quite appropriate; even if ich mach 
dich fertig (meaning something close to ‘I’ll let you have it’) reflects the 
meaning of cooking somebody’s goose, as the saying goes, it is not 
consistent with the other phrases. I therefore prefer the translation below. 
Suggested alternative:
“Du, ich hau dich in die Pfanne, brate dein Herz und streich’s mir auf’s Brot!”
Example 22
English version page 241:
“A City Visible But Unseen”
German version page 321:
“Eine Stadt: sichtbar, aber ungeschaut”
Jahilia––“A City Visible But Unseen”––is Rushdie’s equivalent of Mecca, the 
name Jahilia itself refers to a term used by Muslims denoting the period of 
history prior to the revelation of the Q’uran. It means ‘ignorance’, or 
‘barbarism’, and today it is a word of contempt meaning “unislamic” 
(Easterman68 1992:34). The caption sichtbar, aber ungeschaut does, 
however, not strike the same chord as the English rendering. A literal 
translation would be something like ‘eine Stadt, die jeder sehen könnte, die 
jedoch keiner wahrnimmt’ (a city everybody could see but no-one actually 
perceives).  Personally, I would prefer ‘die (un)sichtbare Stadt’ (i.e. the 
(in)visible city) or some such, even if the original types of adjectives––the first 
a proper one, which implies a property, the second a past participle, which 
implies an agent––would thus be lost. 
68 Easterman, Daniel. "What is Fundamental to Islam?" in New Jerusalems: Reflections on 
Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Rushdie Affair. London: Grafton, 1992, pp. 29-44
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Suggested alternatives:
“Jahilia––die (un)sichtbare Stadt”
“Erkennbar, jedoch nicht offenbar”
“Sichtbar und doch übersehen”
Example 23
English version page 254:
“(i) First light, and the (ii) dawn chorus began, (iii) chattering of road-drills, (iv) 
chirrup of burglar alarms, (v) trumpeting of wheeled creatures clashing at 
corners, the (vi) deep whirr of a large olive-green garbage eater, screaming 
radio-voices from a wooden painter’s cradle (vii) clinging to the upper storey 
of a Free House, (viii) roar of the great wakening juggernauts rushing 
awesomely down this long but narrow pathway.”
German version page 337:
“Das (i) erste Licht. Und der (ii) Chor der Morgendämmerung setzte ein: das 
(iii) Dröhnen von Preßlufthämmern, das (iv) Heulen von Alarmglocken, das 
(v) Trompeten bereifter Wesen, die an den Kreuzungen aneinandergerieten, 
das (vi) tiefe Brummen eines großen olivgrünen Müllfressers, kreischende 
Radiostimmen auf einem hölzernen Malergerüst, das sich an das obere 
Geschoß einer Gaststätte (vii) schmiegte, das (viii) Brüllen der mächtigen, 
eben aufgewachten Schwerlastzüge, die furchterregend auf diesem langen, 
aber schmalen Weg dahineilten.”
The analogy here refers to the way in which the birds (ii) welcome the new 
day in the (i) early hours of the morning. However, Rushdie uses this image 
as a parody, comparing birds and other animate creatures with man-made 
modern contraptions (MACHINES ARE ANIMALS). The onomatopoeic 
sounds of (iii) chattering and (iv) chirruping are confined to birds, while (v) 
trumpeting and (viii) roaring are sounds emitted by much larger animals, 
even predators. It would be beside the point to analyse in detail which 
machine represents which animal and what the exact entailments are; the 
metaphor basically rests upon the use of ANIMATE FOR INANIMATE, which 
109
is sadly neglected by the translator. The painter’s scaffolding is likened to ivy 
or wine that (vii) clings to a building, whereas anschmiegen merely means to 
snuggle up to something or someone, which is not nearly strong enough to 
reflect the image intended by the author.
Suggested alternative:
“Anbruch des Tages, und der Chor der Morgendämmerung setzte ein: das 
Schnattern der Preßlufthämmer, das Tschilpen von Alarmanlagen, das 
Trompeten bereifter Wesen, die beim Abbiegen aneinandergerieten, das tiefe 
Surren eines olivgrünen  Müllschluckers, kreischende Radiostimmen auf 
einem hölzernen Malergerüst, das sich an das obere Geschoß eines Lokals 
anklammerte, das Brüllen der mächtigen, erwachenden LKW-Züge, die 
ehrfurchtgebietend diesen langen, aber schmalen Weg entlangrasten.“ 
Example 24
English version page 260:
“It’s not just the (i) dentals that go wrong […] The (ii) fucking plosives scare 
me stupid. I keep thinking I’ll (iii) spray the old bones on the street again. 
Age, Chamcha: it’s all humiliations. (iv) You get born, you get (v) beaten up
and (vi) bruised all over and finally you (vii) break and they shovel you into an 
urn.”
German version pages 344/345:
“Es ist nicht bloß das (i) Gebiß, das mir Sorgen macht […] Ich hab’ eine 
Wahnsinnsangst vor den (ii) Scheißverschlußlauten. Ich denke andauernd 
daran, daß ich wieder (iii) hinsegeln werde. Das Alter, Chamcha. Eine 
einzige Erniedrigung. (iv) Man wird geboren, man wird (v) geschlagen und 
(vi) getreten, und am Ende (vii) legt man den Löffel weg und wird in eine 
Urne geschaufelt.”
Mimi Mimoulian, Chamcha’s former working colleague and another highly-
gifted voice-over artist, speaks about the foundering of her career after a 
particularly nasty fall through which she has lost her teeth. This is why she 
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has trouble pronouncing some sounds such as dentals and plosives––she 
does not worry about her dentures, as the translator has interpreted the 
beginning of her soliloquy. Furthermore, the expletive (ii) fucking is better 
translated with ‘verdammten’ (damned) as the German compound has some 
even more unsavoury connotations. Rushdie has coined the phrase (iii) to 
spray the old bones, obviously referring to Mimi’s fear of losing her precious 
teeth again, of spitting them out like so much saliva, which does not require 
physical contact with terra firma, whereas hinsegeln (‘to sail down’) does. (iv) 
You get born, nobody asks you for your consent; man wird geboren (one is 
born) is therefore much too general and also loses the personal implication of 
the pronoun you. If you are (v) beaten up (one of the few instances where UP 
is bad), you are more than just given a good hiding; you end up lying on the 
ground with more or less severe injuries, (vi) blaue Flecken (bruises), which 
are the outward sign of your predicament. The version geschlagen und 
getreten (beaten and kicked) are therefore not strong enough to reflect the 
author’s intention. Finally, (vii) den Löffel hinlegen (to put the spoon aside), 
an alternative rendering of the German idiom ‘den Löffel abgeben’ (to hand in 
the spoon, i.e., to kick the bucket), is rather insipid compared to the powerful 
metaphor of HUMAN IS GLASS (or any other brittle substance that can be 
broken into pieces and shovelled into an urn), and the metaphor LIFE IS A 
SHATTERING FORCE also gets lost (a person without a spoon is still too big 
to fit into an urn).69
Suggested alternative:
“Es sind nicht nur die (i) Dentallaute, die nicht funktionieren […] vor den (ii) 
verdammten Verschlußlauten hab ich die allermeiste Angst. Ich glaube 
immer, daß ich die (iii) alten Knochen wieder auf der Straße verteile. Das 
Alter, lieber Chamcha, eine einzige Erniedrigung. (iv) Du kommst ungefragt 
auf die Welt, du wirst (v) zusammengeschlagen, hast überall (vi) blaue 
Flecken, und am Ende (vii) zerbrichst du und wirst in eine Urne geschaufelt.” 
69 This passage is highly reminiscent of the way Karl Moor (in Schiller’s “Die Räuber”) 
describes the human life cycle…
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Example 25
English version page 123:
“He [Mahound] returns to the city [of Jahilia] as quickly as he can, to (i) 
expunge the (ii) foul verses that (iii) reek of brimstone and sulphur, to (iv) 
strike them from the record for ever and ever, so that they will (v) survive in 
just one or two unreliable collections of old traditions and orthodox 
interpreters will try and unwrite their story […]” 
German version page 168:
“So schnell er kann, kehrt er in die Stadt zurück, um die (ii) unreinen Verse (i) 
auszumerzen, die (iii) nach Schwefel stinken, um sie für alle Ewigkeit (iv) aus 
den Akten zu streichen, so daß sie nur in ein oder zwei unzuverlässigen 
Sammlungen alter Überlieferungen (v) überdauern werden, und orthodoxe 
Exegeten werden darangehen, sie ungeschrieben zu machen.”
After a heavy-going wrestling-match between Gibreel in his archangelic guise 
and Mahound, the prophet, the latter rushes back to the city of Jahilia to 
repudiate the verses whispered in his ear by the devil incarnate, convinced 
that he has been duped by the archangel. 
Rushdie uses the attribute (ii) foul to describe the verses uttered by the devil, 
as well as the verb (i) to expunge for Mahound’s effort to get rid of them. The 
adjective is commonly associated with bad odours, with decay even, or with 
very bad behaviour in the figurative sense (see sports language), while the 
epithet unrein (unclean) merely expresses that something is flawed. Although 
it is used in mostly religious contexts, the strong imagery of decay inherent in 
the English word gets lost. The German verb ausmerzen is used for flaws 
that need to be put right; it does, however, not allow for the enormity of the 
blasphemy contained in the verses mentioned. The verb (iii) to reek in 
English refers to both smelling and smoking, a choice which is not available 
in German; still, smoke is usually associated with a pungent odour, affecting 
both the olfactory and the visual senses, whereas smells are not usually 
linked to an image of smoke. To (iv) strike something from the record is a 
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well-known English idiom that does not normally evoke any specific image 
any longer so the translator’s choice of aus den Akten zu streichen seems to 
make sound sense (although maybe the English verb ‘to strike’ may have 
stronger connotations than its German counterpart as it is also used for acts 
of violence). If verses (v) survive, they are likened to a living thing whereas 
überdauern merely implies that they stand the test of time, which is more 
used for inanimate objects. For Rushdie, the Satanic Verses are more than 
objects; however, he seems to regard them as adversaries of the faithful, as 
having a life of their own, which is not reflected in the German rendering. 
Furthermore, it ties in with Mahound’s attempt to ‘kill’ the verses (expunge, 
‘auslöschen’) in the first place.
Suggested alternative:
“Er kehrt so schnell er kann, in die Stadt zurück, um die (ii) mephitischen 
Verse, die (iii) vor Schwefel rauchten, (i) auszulöschen, um sie für alle 
Ewigkeit (iv) aus den Akten zu streichen, so daß sie nur in ein oder zwei 
unzuverlässigen Sammlungen alter Überlieferungen (v) überleben werden, 
und orthodoxe Exegeten werden darangehen, sie ungeschrieben zu 
machen.”
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4. Conclusion
A conclusion seems rather difficult to draw from these thoughts. However, I 
am adamant in my claim that many texts, be they from high-brow literature, 
children’s literature or trash, seem contrived when they are translated from 
English into German, and can be immediately recognised as translations. 
When dealing with metaphor (or, indeed, with any other types of language), 
most translators tend to stick too closely to the original in both the semantic 
and the pragmatic sense, often ignoring any cultural implications a text may 
have. This was already brought home to me with a vengeance when I was a 
child, voraciously reading anything I could get my hands on, and books like 
the German translation of the Chronicles of Narnia by C S Lewis, so popular 
now, were gibberish to me. From the research I have done in the course of 
this paper, I can infer that many a botched translation stems from a bad 
translation of the metaphors involved, which is due to a variety of aspects. 
Any systematic attempt to apply a given or preset pattern to metaphor 
translation surely is doomed to failure from the outset as no two passages 
can ever be compared.
Therefore, any translation of metaphor can only be a compromise, and as 
such, a better or a worse compromise. A one-to-one rendering, without any 
loss, has proved impossible, hence the sub-heading ‘more or less successful 
translations’ which I chose in chapter 4.2.1 above. Such inevitable loss is due 
to a number of facts, as my analysis has shown. Some passages fail to 
evoke the same emotions in the reader; others use words or phrases that are 
not as common in the target as in the source language or vice versa; still 
others do not reflect the same register or syntax. In most of the cases, 
however, it seems that metaphor itself is at the root of the problem: an 
inappropriate rendering of original metaphor in the target language 
fundamentally changes the effect intended by the author and thus the way 
the reader understands and interprets the respective work of literature. 
It seems that intuition still remains the most reliable tool at the translator’s 
disposal, even if some intuitive translations fail miserably––see above. 
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I should like to conclude my thoughts by quoting a passage written by 
Rushdie himself, a passage which seems to apply most to the author himself 
in his effort to come to terms with both his migrant background and the 
reception of his literary work:
The very word metaphor, with its roots in the Greek words for 
bearing across, describes a sort of migration, the migration of 
ideas into images. Migrants––borne-across humans––are 
metaphorical beings in their very essence.
      (Imaginary Homelands, page 278).
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Appendix
Abstract (German)
Seit dem Durchbruch der beiden amerikanischen Autoren George Lakoff und 
Mark Johnson vor mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten erfreut sich die kognitive 
Metapherntheorie großer Beliebtheit und wissenschaftlicher Akzeptanz, da 
sie bislang unbekannte Verknüpfungen im menschlichen Bewußtsein 
aufzeigt. Metaphern sind mehr als bloße Tropen, sie sind essentielle 
Instrumente des Denkens, und eine Analyse unserer gängigsten Metaphern 
entlarvt diese als Helfer unseres Zurechtkommens mit Situationen und 
Vorstellungen, welche wir ansonsten nicht verstehen, geschweige denn 
akzeptieren könnten – wie zum Beispiel Sterben und Tod. Auch wenn die 
Existenz einiger universeller metaphorischer Konzepte außer Zweifel steht, 
so scheinen doch die meisten Metaphern an eine bestimmte 
Weltanschauung bzw. Kultur gebunden zu sein, was bedeutet, daß eine 
Übersetzung solcher Metaphern sehr schwierig oder gar unmöglich sein 
muß. Der umstrittene indischstämmige Autor Salman Rushdie ist ein Meister 
der Metaphern; seine blumige Sprache verbindet niveauvolles Englisch mit 
indischer Umgangssprache und schafft auf diese Weise einen einzigartigen 
Stil, der eigentlich unübersetzbar ist, besonders im Falle seines international 
bekannten Werks The Satanic Verses. Diese Arbeit ist der Versuch, dies 
anhand einer Vielzahl von Beispielen zu illustrieren und die Schwierigkeiten 
aufzuzeigen, welche die Übersetzung von Metaphern von einer Sprache in 
eine andere, bzw. deren Transfer von einer Kultur in eine andere, in sich 
birgt.  
Abstract (English)
Ever since American linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson succeeded 
in proving the ubiquity of metaphor in our everyday lives, their cognitive 
theory of metaphor has been thriving among professionals and amateurs
alike. Metaphors are much more than mere tropes; they are essential tools of 
thought, and an analysis of our most common metaphors has shown that we 
rely upon them to come to terms with situations and concepts otherwise 
unacceptable to us, such as death or grief. While some metaphoric concepts 
undoubtedly span more than just one culture and language, most metaphors 
seem to be culture-specific and therefore difficult, if not downright impossible,
to translate, at least not without incurring any kind of loss in the process. 
Indian-born author Salman Rushdie is a past master of metaphor, and his 
highly imaginative prose has proved difficult indeed for the translator of The 
Satanic Verses. This paper aims to point towards specific problems one may 
encounter when endeavouring to translate metaphor from one language to 
another, or rather when transferring it from one culture to another. 
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